Apes know that hidden objects can affect the orientation of other objects

Four bonobos, seven gorillas, and six orangutans were presented with two small rectangular boards on a platform. One of the boards had a piece of food under it so that it acquired an inclined orientation whereas the other remained flat on the platform. Subjects preferentially selected the inclined board. In another experiment, subjects were initially presented with two inclined boards and a transformation took place in which one of the boards fell flat to the platform while the other remained inclined. Subjects also preferred the board that remained inclined. Two additional experiments highlighted some of the possible limitations of their reasoning in this task. Presented with two inclined boards, one of which was visibly supported by a piece of wood, they failed to systematically select the unsupported one whose only reason for being inclined was the presence of the reward. Another experiment presented two rewards in each trial (instead of the customary one) in one of the following two combinations: large banana vs. small carrot or small banana vs. large carrot. Prior to the test, E presented both rewards to the subject and then hid each of them under one of the boards so that both boards were differentially inclined due to the different sizes of the rewards involved. Although subjects selected the board that showed a greater inclination (thus securing the larger reward), they disregarded the type of food that was involved. This often meant that they chose the large carrot over the small banana even though they reversed such a choice when the rewards were not occluded by the boards. Providing subjects with a 'reminder' of the type of reward hidden under the boards did not alter the original results. There was no evidence of learning throughout the various experiments and control tests ruled out the possibility of inadvertent cuing by the experimenter, poor performance due to a lack of motivation, or good performance due to a predisposition to select objects with sloped surfaces. It is concluded that subjects made some inferences about the reason for the inclined orientation of the boards, and not simply associated an inclined orientation with the presence of the reward.     

Cross-dimension-ambivalent in-group stereotypes: the moderating roles of social context of stereotype endorsement and in-group identification

In this study, the authors examined in-group stereotypes that are cross-dimensionally ambivalent-simultaneously (a) positive in cognition-related content dimensions and negative in affect-related content dimensions or (b) negative in cognition-related content dimensions and positive in affect-related content dimensions-to establish whether endorsement of such in-group stereotypes depends on whether this process occurs in an intragroup versus intergroup context. Drawing on social identity theory, the authors predicted that (a) endorsement of cross-dimension-ambivalent in-group stereotypes would be greater in an intragroup, relative to an intergroup, context and (b) this would hold for high but not low in-group identifiers. Confirming these hypotheses, results showed that endorsement of cross-dimension-ambivalent in-group stereotypes may vary as a function of their contribution to securing a positive social identity.     

Do gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) fail to represent objects in the context of cohesion violations?

Recent research suggests that witnessing events of fission (e.g., the splitting of a solid object) impairs human infants’, human adults’, and non-human primates’ object representations. The present studies investigated the reactions of gorillas and orangutans to cohesion violation across different types of fission events implementing a behavioral paradigm previously used with human infants. Results suggest that fission events vary in their impact on representational abilities but do not destroy apes’ representations of continuously existing objects.     

Do apes know that they could be wrong?

When confronted with uncertain or incomplete information in decision-making situations, monkeys and apes opt for either escaping the situation or seeking additional information. These responses have been interpreted as evidence of metacognitive abilities. However, this interpretation has been challenged. On the one hand, studies using the information-seeking paradigm have been criticized because subjects may simply engage in a search for information routine (e.g., search until spot the reward) without any metacognitive involvement. On the other hand, studies using the escape response paradigm have been criticized because subjects may not recognize their own state of uncertainty but have learned to use the escape response in the presence of certain stimuli configurations that create uncertainty. The current study attempted to address these two criticisms by presenting great apes (seven gorillas, eight chimpanzees, four bonobos, seven orangutans) with a seeking information task whose basic procedure consisted of presenting two hollow tubes, baiting one of them and letting subjects choose. Conditions varied depending on whether subjects had visual access to the baiting, the cost associated with seeking information, the time interval between baiting and choosing, the food quality and the additional information offered regarding the food’s location. Although subjects showed a high retrieval accuracy when they had witnessed the baiting, they were more likely to check inside the tube before choosing when high stakes were involved (Experiment 3) or after a longer period of time had elapsed between the baiting and the retrieval of the reward (Experiment 2). In contrast, providing subjects with indirect auditory information about the food’s location or increasing the cost of checking reduced checking before choosing (Experiment 1). Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects knew that they could be wrong when choosing.     

Monkeys fail to reciprocate in an exchange task

Exchanges form the basis of human economies. Animals too can engage in reciprocal interactions but they do not barter goods like humans, which raises the question of the abilities necessary for trading to occur. Previous studies have shown that non-human primates can exchange food with human partners. Here, we tested the ability of brown capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques to reciprocate in a task requiring two conspecifics to exchange tokens in order to obtain rewards from an experimenter. We recorded 56 transfers between subjects in capuchin monkeys and 10 in Tonkean macaques. All transfers were passive in both species. Capuchins preferentially picked up tokens valuable for them in the partner’s compartment. They tended to manipulate the partner-valued tokens more often than the no-value ones, leading to more opportunities for these tokens to end up within reach of the partner. Despite optimal conditions where values of goods were defined and known by partners, however, none of the pairs tested engaged in short-term reciprocal interactions. These results indicate that calculated reciprocity was difficult if not impossible in the animals tested.     

Prospective object search in dogs: mixed evidence for knowledge of <Emphasis Type="Italic">What</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Where</Emphasis>

We investigated whether two dogs that had been specially trained to retrieve objects by their names were able to integrate information about the identity (What) as well as the location (Where) of those objects so that they could plan their search accordingly. In a first study, two sets of objects were placed in two separate rooms and subjects were asked to retrieve the objects, one after the other. Both dogs remembered the identity of the objects as they reliably retrieved the correct objects. One of the dogs was also able to integrate information about the object’s location as he chose the correct location in which the object had been placed. Further investigation of the second dog’s behavior revealed that she followed a more stereotyped search strategy. Despite this variation in performance, this study provides evidence for the memory of What and Where in a domestic dog and shows the prospective use of such information in a search task.     

Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and children (Homo sapiens).

Juvenile and adult orangutans (n = 5; Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (n = 7; Pan troglodytes), and 19- and 26-month-old children (n = 24; Homo sapiens) received visible and invisible displacements. Three containers were presented forming a straight line, and a small box was used to displace a reward under them. Subjects received 3 types of displacement: single (the box visited 1 container), double adjacent (the box visited 2 contiguous containers), and double nonadjacent (the box visited 2 noncontiguous containers). All species performed at comparable levels, solving all problems except the invisible nonadjacent displacements. Visible displacements were easier than invisible, and single were easier than double displacements. In a 2nd experiment, subjects saw the baiting of either 2 adjacent or 2 nonadjacent containers with no displacements. All species selected the empty container more often when the baited containers were nonadjacent than when they were adjacent. It is hypothesized that a response bias and inhibition problem were responsible for the poor performance in nonadjacent displacements.     

Comprehension of signs by dolphins (Tursiops truncatus)

The authors assessed the ability of 6 captive dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) to comprehend without explicit training 3 human communicative signs (pointing, directed gaze, and replica). Pointing consisted of indicating the target item with the index finger and a fully extended arm. Directed gaze consisted of orienting the head and eyes toward the target item while the rest of the body remained stationary. The replica signal consisted of holding up an exact duplicate of the target item. On the initial series of 12 trials for each condition, 3 dolphins performed above chance on pointing, 2 on gaze, and none for replica. With additional trials, above chance performance increased to 4 dolphins for pointing, 6 for gazing, and 2 for replica. The replica sign seemed to be the most taxing for them (only 2 dolphins achieved results significantly above chance). Taken together, these results indicate that dolphins are able to interpret untrained communicative signs successfully.     

Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.     

Bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang utans use feature and spatial cues in two spatial memory tasks

Animals commonly use feature and spatial strategies when remembering places of interest such as food sources or hiding places. We conducted three experiments with great apes to investigate strategy preferences and factors that may shape them. In the first experiment, we trained 17 apes to remember 12 different food locations on the floor of their sleeping room. The 12 food locations were associated with one feature cue, so that feature and spatial cues were confounded. In a single test session, we brought the cues into conflict and found that apes, irrespective of species, showed a preference for a feature strategy. In the second experiment, we used a similar procedure and trained 25 apes to remember one food location on a platform in front of them. On average, apes preferred to use a feature strategy but some individuals relied on a spatial strategy. In the final experiment, we investigated whether training might influence strategy preferences. We tested 21 apes in the platform set-up and found that apes used both, feature and spatial strategies irrespective of training. We conclude that apes can use feature and spatial strategies to remember the location of hidden food items, but that task demands (e.g. different numbers of search locations) can influence strategy preferences. We found no evidence, however, for the role of training in shaping these preferences.