Color is necessary for face discrimination in the Northern paper wasp,Polistes fuscatus

Animal Cognition - Visual individual recognition requires animals to distinguish among conspecifics based on appearance. Though visual individual recognition has been reported in a range of taxa...     

Establishing arbitrary comparative relations and referential transformations of stimulus function in individuals with autism

Relational Frame Theory posits that complex language develops through arbitrarily applicable relational networks, with potential implications for individuals with autism. Responding relationally based on comparison occurs when participants respond to any number of comparative properties, such as “bigger” or “faster.” Experiment 1 established two 3-member comparative networks, in which a stimulus A was conditioned as “bigger” or “faster” than a stimulus B, and the stimulus B was conditioned as “bigger” or “faster” than a stimulus C in 2 children with autism. Both participants met the mastery criterion for the trained relations and demonstrated the emergence of the untrained combinatorially entailed A–C and C–A relations. The participants could also match the arbitrary A stimuli with larger or faster objects and the C stimuli with smaller or slower objects. The results were replicated in Experiment 2 with the same participants, where a 5-member relational network was established for the bigger/smaller relation.     

Detecting back irrelevant responding on the Personality Assessment Inventory in a psychiatric inpatient setting

The present studies focus on strategies for detecting back irrelevant responding (BIR) on the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; L. C. Morey, 1991). Moderate BIR levels can greatly affect the clinical scales of the PAI. Further, the PAI's Inconsistency and Infrequency validity scales are less than optimal for detecting BIR. L. C. Morey and C. J. Hopwood (2004) developed an alternative strategy for detecting BIR that involves comparison of 2 scales from the PAI short-form with the same 2 scales from the PAI full-instrument. The present study examines how different BIR levels affect the clinical, treatment, and interpersonal scales of the PAI in 2 psychiatric inpatient samples. The effectiveness of various strategies for detecting BIR in an inpatient setting is also discussed. Consistent with previous research, moderate rates of BIR impacted several PAI scales in a meaningful way. The Inconsistency and Infrequency validity scales of the PAI were relatively ineffective for detecting low-to-moderate BIR levels. Conversely, the short-form full-instrument comparison strategy was much more sensitive to BIR. Finally, a new BIR detection indicator is presented that improves sensitivity rates for detecting all BIR levels in an acute setting. The implications of these results for detecting BIR in inpatient settings are discussed.     

Reducing an in‐group bias in preschool children: the impact of moral behavior

How impressionable are in‐group biases in early childhood? Previous research shows that young children display robust preferences for members of their own social group, but also condemn those who harm others. The current study investigates children's evaluations of agents when their group membership and moral behavior conflict. After being assigned to a minimal group, 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children either saw their in‐group member behave antisocially, an out‐group member act prosocially, or control agents, for whom moral information was removed. Children's explicit preference for and willingness to share with their in‐group member was significantly attenuated in the presence of an antisocial in‐group member, but not a prosocial out‐group member. Interestingly, children's learning decisions were unmoved by a person's moral behavior, instead being consistently guided by group membership. This demonstrates that children's in‐group bias is remarkably flexible: while moral information curbs children's in‐group bias on social evaluations, social learning is still driven by group information.     

Teaching foundational perspective‐taking skills to children with autism using the PEAK‐T curriculum: single‐reversal “I–You” deictic frames

We taught basic perspective‐taking tasks to 3 children with autism and evaluated their ability to derive mutually entailed single‐reversal deictic relations of those newly established perspective‐taking skills. Furthermore, we examined the possibility of transfers of perspective‐taking function to novel untrained stimuli. The methods were taken from the PEAK‐T training curriculum, and results yielded positive gains for all 3 children to learn basic perspective taking as well as for 2 of the 3 to derive untrained single‐reversal I relations following direct training of single‐reversal You relations. All participants demonstrated a transfer of stimulus function to untrained stimuli after the single‐reversal deictic relations had been mastered.     

Searching while loaded: Visual working memory does not interfere with hybrid search efficiency but hybrid search uses working memory capacity

In “hybrid search” tasks, such as finding items on a grocery list, one must search the scene for targets while also searching the list in memory. How is the representation of a visual item compared with the representations of items in the memory set? Predominant theories would propose a role for visual working memory (VWM) either as the site of the comparison or as a conduit between visual and memory systems. In seven experiments, we loaded VWM in different ways and found little or no effect on hybrid search performance. However, the presence of a hybrid search task did reduce the measured capacity of VWM by a constant amount regardless of the size of the memory or visual sets. These data are broadly consistent with an account in which VWM must dedicate a fixed amount of its capacity to passing visual representations to long-term memory for comparison to the items in the memory set. The data cast doubt on models in which the search template resides in VWM or where memory set item representations are moved from LTM through VWM to earlier areas for comparison to visual items.     

Why the view of intellect in De Anima I 4 is not Aristotle’s own

In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s argument for the indestructibility of intellect via an analogy to perception does not fit with Aristotle’s own views. Aristotle thinks that perception operates via bodily organs, but denies this of understanding. He also requires separability from the body for indestructibility, something this analogy rules out. However, Aristotle’s Platonist interlocutors may well endorse such an argument. My dialectical interpretation best resolves the interpretative difficulties and explains its place in the larger context, Aristotle’s discussion of Platonist views on the soul. Aristotle presents a challenge to his insistence that the soul is subject to change, dialectically resolves that challenge, and then ends by reserving the right to give a different account of the intellect.     

Counterfactual reasoning and the problem of selecting antecedent scenarios

A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of selecting antecedent scenarios,” and show that this is an essential challenge in real-life counterfactual reasoning. Then, I demonstrate that the major extant theories of counterfactuals (especially the Lewis/Stalnaker theory and Igal Kvart’s rival account) are unable to solve this problem. I show that there are instances of real-life counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences that are counterexamples to both of these accounts. And finally, I develop a new theory of how to select antecedent scenarios that overcomes these difficulties, and so would be part of a more adequate theory of counterfactuals (and counterfactual reasoning).     

Quantity recognition among speakers of an anumeric language

Recent research has suggested that the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe with a number‐less language, are able to match quantities > 3 if the matching task does not require recall or spatial transposition. This finding contravenes previous work among the Pirahã. In this study, we re‐tested the Pirahãs’ performance in the crucial one‐to‐one matching task utilized in the two previous studies on their numerical cognition, as well as in control tasks requiring recall and mental transposition. We also conducted a novel quantity recognition task. Speakers were unable to consistently match quantities > 3, even when no recall or transposition was involved. We provide a plausible motivation for the disparate results previously obtained among the Pirahã. Our findings are consistent with the suggestion that the exact recognition of quantities > 3 requires number terminology.