Self-Censorship

This article seeks to explore the conceptual structure and moral standing of an idea that has received almost no attention from analytical philosophers: self-censorship. It is argued that at the heart of the concept is a tension between the thoughts of the self-censor as, on the one hand, the author, and on the other, the instrument, of the censorship. Which of these aspects is emphasised also importantly helps shape how self-censorship is viewed normatively. Focusing on authorship tends to lead to seeing self-censorship as more akin to a freely chosen act of self-restraint, while focusing on the self-censor as instrument presents it as one specific form of ordinary censorship. It is the tension between these two aspects that accounts for the moral ambivalence that is often felt towards the practice of self-censorship.     

Tactile sensitivity in Asperger syndrome

People with autism and Asperger syndrome are anecdotally said to be hypersensitive to touch. In two experiments, we measured tactile thresholds and suprathreshold tactile sensitivity in a group of adults with Asperger syndrome. In the first experiment, tactile perceptual thresholds were measured. Two frequencies of vibrotactile stimulation were used: 30 and 200 Hz. The results demonstrated significantly lower tactile perceptual thresholds in the Asperger group at 200 Hz but not at 30 Hz, thus confirming tactile hypersensitivity but only for one class of stimulus. A second experiment investigated whether self-produced movement affected the perception of touch in a group of adults with Asperger syndrome. A suprathreshold tactile stimulus was produced either by the participant (self-produced condition) or by the experimenter (externally produced condition) and participants were asked to rate the perception of the tactile stimulation. The results demonstrated that, while both Asperger and control groups rated self-produced touch as less tickly than external touch, the Asperger group rated both types of tactile stimulus as significantly more tickly and intense than did the control group. This experiment confirms the finding of tactile hypersensitivity, but shows that the perceptual consequences of self-produced touch are attenuated in the normal way in people with Asperger syndrome. An abnormality in this process cannot therefore account for their tactile hypersensitivity.     

Measuring automatic retrieval: a comparison of implicit memory, process dissociation, and speeded response procedures

Using the stem completion task, we compared estimates of automatic retrieval from an implicit memory task, the process dissociation procedure, and the speeded response procedure. Two standard manipulations were employed. In Experiment 1, a depth of processing effect was found on automatic retrieval using the speeded response procedure although this effect was substantially reduced in Experiment 2 when lexical processing was required of all words. In Experiment 3, the speeded response procedure showed an advantage of full versus divided attention at study on automatic retrieval. An implicit condition showed parallel effects in each study, suggesting that implicit stem completion may normally provide a good estimate of automatic retrieval. Also, we replicated earlier findings from the process dissociation procedure, but estimates of automatic retrieval from this procedure were consistently lower than those from the speeded response procedure, except when conscious retrieval was relatively low. We discuss several factors that may contribute to the conflicting outcomes, including the evidence for theoretical assumptions and criterial task differences between implicit and explicit tests.     

The Limits Of Human Nature

It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding norms that would otherwise follow from their theory.One argument is that certain commitments ground psychological incapacitiesthat prevent us from doing what would maximize the good. Another is that we would be likely to suffer some kind of psychological demoralization if we tried to become significantly more selfless. I argue that influential versions of both of these arguments underestimate our deliberative resources, and also fail to examine the kind of moral sources that may be able to sustain rigorous moral endeavour. Pessimism about our capacities for such endeavour results from the neglect of these factors, rather than from uncovering any significant limitations in human nature.     

Disciplinary roots and branches of evaluation: Some lessons from agricultural research

Since its origins in North America in the 1960s, the field of program evaluation has grown considerably, and its concerns have broadened from accountability to program improvement, decision support, and institutional learning. Program evaluation is now commonly practiced in governmental organizations not only in North America but also in many countries of Western Europe and Oceania. Although program evaluation is a relatively new field with many controversies and lively debates, a unifying body of evaluation theory, methods, and standards is gradually emerging. Evaluation has recently been described as a “transdiscipline,” as are statistics and measurement. This article is based largely on my personal experiences working in agricultural research organizations in developing regions. Here, a number of different types of evaluation are carried out, but program evaluation as defined by Patton (1997) and as practiced by social scientists to assess public programs is largely unknown. Distinct branches of agricultural research evaluation can be identified, with disciplinary roots in the natural sciences and in agricultural economics. The most rigorous agricultural research evaluations are economic studies. Systematic internal evaluation is notably lacking. Current pressures to improve performance, transparency, and accountability are creating demands for more systematic evaluation, and many program evaluation concepts and methods would seem to be of value in agricultural research organizations. However, in the current scenario of declining funding for agricultural research, managers are yet to be convinced to expand their evaluation activities and explore unfamiliar paradigms and methods. Moreover, they are not yet convinced that social-science-based program evaluation would produce useful results. Natural scientists and economists tend to view program evaluation as “soft-science” or no science at all. Douglas Horton works at the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) in The Netherlands. Since joining ISNAR in early 1990, he has done research, training, and advisory work on agricultural research management, with an emphasis on evaluation. Previously, for fifteen years, Horton was head of the social science department of the International Potato Center (CIP) in Peru. With colleagues at CIP and in national agricultural research organizations, he documented patterns and trends in world potato production and use, engaged in participatory technology development and assessed the impact of CIP programs. Horton received B.S. and M.S. degrees in agricultural economics from the University of Illinois, and a Ph.D. in economics from Cornell University. While at Cornell, Horton worked with W.F. Whyte, pioneer in the fields of participant observation and participatory action research.     

Understanding the attraction process

A comprehensive model of interpersonal attraction is presented in which attraction is an emotion expressed to regulate interpersonal relationships. The model proposes that cognitive appraisals, the subjective experience, and the expression of affiliative behavior are fundamental to understanding how attraction operates. Specifically, we discuss how (a) cognitive appraisals (willingness and ability) are fundamental to the subjective experience of attraction, (b) social dilemma considerations affect when and why the subjective experience aligns with the expression of affiliative behavior, (c) the interplay of the components of attraction explain the panoply of extant attraction phenomena, and (d) the attraction process operates in both initial interactions and enduring relationships. We conclude with a discussion of methodological and theoretical directions to fuel future growth.     

Measuring automatic retrieval

A variety of procedures have been used to assess automatic retrieval effects on memory, including implicit memory tests and the process dissociation approach. Theoretical concerns with each are summarized prior to describing a procedure for evaluating automatic retrieval that is based on retrieval speed. Specifically, in a speeded implicit task, participants were encouraged to complete word stems using strictly automatic retrieval by presenting several practice test trials that did not allow responding based on previously studied items and by encouraging speed of responding. This speeded implicit task was compared with a condition in which conscious retrieval of studied information was not possible and a condition in which conscious retrieval was required, providing converging evidence to support the hypothesis that the speeded implicit procedure can yield pure estimates of automatic retrieval. Furthermore, evidence from a standard implicit memory task yielded comparable data that suggests that participants engaged automatic retrieval processes on this task also.     

The Scientist-Practitioner Model: Now More Than Ever

The scientist-practitioner model has been fundamental to the field of professional psychology for over 50 years. Although other training models have been offered in an attempt to improve training or meet other needs, we view many of the changes suggested by these models as consistent with the original intent of scientist-practitioner training. We argue that the reciprocal effects of science and practice within this model, if appropriately integrated, remain an excellent fit for integrating science and practice and enhancing the quality of both the practice and science of psychology. We address some of the problems with how the model has been implemented and offer recommendations for ways to enhance science and practice integration. Finally, we describe some of the mechanisms we have used to put these principles into practice in our counseling psychology training program.