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931.
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934.
Andrew C. Khoury 《The Journal of value inquiry》2011,45(2):135-146
935.
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937.
938.
Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
939.
Christoph Kelp 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):287-292
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing
a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical
propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining
a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge. 相似文献
940.
Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many
plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness
internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we
show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn.
We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s
other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat. 相似文献