Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

Expectation-based and data-based illusory correlation: the effects of confirming versus disconfirming evidence

The present study (n=154) examines the effects of expectations and stimulus information on the perception of illusory correlation. There have been few studies attempting to integrate expectation-based and data- (distinctiveness-) based processes. These studies suggest that data-based illusory correlation can be overruled by prior expectations, but it is not clear whether this is a consequence of a confirmation bias. In the present study, where participants were not exposed to the specific stimulus information, expectation was manipulated by stating that group B behaved more negatively than group A. Moreover, participants were provided with information contained in a statement-rating task that allowed for the confirmation and disconfirmation of the prior expectations. Participants rated the desirability of these behaviours and also performed the standard illusory correlation tasks. Based on self-categorization theory and Alloy and Tabachnik (1984), we predicted that in the absence of prior expectations, completing the rating task before the illusory correlation tasks would produce stronger illusory correlation than the reverse order. However, in the presence of prior expectations we expected the rating task to undermine illusory correlation, because the information obtained in this task tends to disconfirm prior expectations. Results support the predicted interaction between task order and expectation. We discuss some implications for research on confirmation bias.     

The Moderating Relationship of Spirituality on Negative Life Events and Psychological Adjustment

The authors used a path model to examine how spirituality moderates relationships between negative life experiences and psychological adjustment, operationalized for this study as levels of depression and anxiety. Results suggest that spirituality provides a significant moderating effect for both depression and anxiety. The moderating effect was stronger for depression than for anxiety.     

ETHNIC GROUP DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE ABILITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS: A META-ANALYSIS

The cognitive ability levels of different ethnic groups have interested psychologists for over a century. Many narrative reviews of the empirical literature in the area focus on the Black-White differences, and the reviews conclude that the mean difference in cognitive ability ( g ) is approximately 1 standard deviation; that is, the generally accepted effect size is about 1.0. We conduct a meta-analytic review that suggests that the one standard deviation effect size accurately summarizes Black-White differences for college application tests (e.g., SAT) and overall analyses of tests of g for job applicants in corporate settings. However, the 1 standard deviation summary of group differences fails to capture many of the complexities in estimating ethnic group differences in employment settings. For example, our results indicate that job complexity, the use of within job versus across job study design, focus on applicant versus incumbent samples, and the exact construct of interest are important moderators of standardized group differences. In many instances, standardized group differences are less than 1 standard deviation. We conduct similar analyses for Hispanics, when possible, and note that Hispanic-White differences are somewhat less than Black-White differences.