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ROBERT F. CARD 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2004,85(2):149-172
Abstract: A powerful objection to impersonal moral theories states that they cannot accommodate the good of friendship. This paper focuses on the problem as it applies to consequentialism and addresses the recent criticism that even the most sophisticated forms of consequentialism are incompatible with genuine friendship. I argue that this objection fails since those who pose this challenge either seriously oversimplify consequentialism's theory of value, misunderstand its theory of practical reason, or put too much weight on the good of friendship itself. I conclude by assessing a contemporary consequentialist response in order to suggest a workable conception of consequentialist friendship. 相似文献