CONSCIENCE, MORAL TRUTH, AND MORAL ERRORS: SOME RESPONSES TO EDMUND LEITES

Edmund Leites's lucid article on conscience, casuistry, and moral decision in the Church of England in the late 17th and early 18th centuries has amply demonstrated how the idea of conscience developed and changed from a background assumption of moral autonomy to that of self-reliance in addition to the belief in moral autonomy. In this shift the art of moral casuistry has gradually lost its original relevance and even become a forgotten idea. It may be wondered why this happened and what significance may be adduced from this. It may also be wondered what philosophical evaluation can be rendered of casuistry independent of the historical nexus of its transformation. From a comparative perspective in connection with the Chinese heritage, Leites's paper provides excellent evidence for the surprising existence of similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and Western traditions even though the metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds of these strains of thought are radically different. This difference in metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds raises some profound philosophical questions which are indicated in Leites's comments on my original article. In this response, I shall first discuss similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and English sources, and then explore briefly the different metaphiscal structures underlying these thoughts. I shall finally consider what theoretical conclusions are warranted in light of both the article and the comments of Edmund Leites.