"This is Simply What I Do"

Wittgenstein's discussion of rule‐following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called “the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context. pertains to general predication. Rule‐following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule‐following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a sceptic.     

Phonemic Processes in Children's Listening and Reading Comprehension

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the role of phonemic activation in children's listening and reading comprehension. Phonemically confusing stories were presented in a listening comprehension task to kindergarten and second-grade children and in a reading comprehension task to second-grade children only. Rhymes induced phonemic confusion more consistently than did alliteratives in both the listening and reading tasks at both grade levels, suggesting that rhyme is inherently more confusing than alliteration, and furthermore, that phonemic information is activated in similar ways when children listen and when they read silently. Children's reading skill was also assessed to examine a possible relationship between reading skill and phonemic sensitivity, but no significant interactions between children's reading skill and their sensitivity to phonemic confusion were found in the reading task. In the listening task, all groups showed phonemic confusion in gist recall scores, but prereaders were less likely than readers to exhibit susceptibility to phonemic confusion in verbatim recall scores.     

Identity Implications of Influence Goals A Revised Analysis of Face-Threatening Acts and Application to Seeking Compliance With Same-Sex Friends

Although politeness theory offers one explanation for how threats to face arise during compliance-gaining episodes, it neither predicts the conditions under which seeking compliance will create multiple face threats nor explains how such threats arise within specific contexts. The authors challenge and revise politeness theory by analyzing potential implications for both parties' face when the logical preconditions for seeking compliance are framed by specific influence goals. In a test of a revised analysis of face threats, young adults imagined asking favors, giving advice, and enforcing obligations with same-sex friends. Perceived face threats, interaction goals, and message qualities varied substantially across compliance-gaining situations defined by these goals. Directions for exploring the identity implications of influence goals across relationships and cultures are discussed.     

Can Levinson's Intentional‐Historical Definition of Art Accommodate Revolutionary Art?

In this article, I examine whether Jerrold Levinson's intentional‐historical definition of art can successfully accommodate revolutionary art. For Levinson, an item is art if it was intended to be regarded as some prior art was regarded. But revolutionary art involves a regard that is “completely distinct” from preexisting art regards. I consider and reject Levinson's proposed solutions to the problem of accommodating revolutionary art. I then defend an alternative account of transgressive art regard. Unfortunately for the intentional‐historical definition, the acceptance of transgressive art regard in conjunction with some recent theories of the development of human behavioral modernity may commit the definition to including nonart, prehistoric tools.