RELATIVISM AND NORMATIVE NONREALISM: BASING MORALITY ON RATIONALITY

Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude-independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open-question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason-based morality.     

The Professionalization of Faculty at Religious Colleges and Universities

As faculty become defined more by the professional norms of their discipline, the potential for conflict with the faith-based norms of religious colleges and universities should increase. Survey responses from over 1,900 faculty at six religious colleges and universities show that most faculty members support including religious criteria in hiring, contrary to professional, disciplinary norms, but most faculty reject religious constraints on academic freedom, conforming to professional norms. These seemingly conflicting positions are reconciled by a high level of commitment to the integration of faith and learning.