Bias versus bias: Harnessing hindsight to reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics

Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics.     

Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless

One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental state is in fact luminous. But his argument depends on an excessively strong account of luminosity. I formulate a weaker conception of luminosity that is unaffected by Williamson’s argument and yet is substantial enough to satisfy those who wish to retain this part of the Cartesian tradition.     

Older adults prefer less choice than young adults

Previous research has demonstrated that older adults prefer less autonomy and seek less information when making decisions on their own relative to young adults (for a review, see M. Mather, 2006). Would older adults also prefer fewer options from which to choose? The authors tested this hypothesis in the context of different decision domains. Participants completed a choice preferences survey in which they indicated their desired number of choices across 6 domains of health care and everyday decisions. The hypothesis was confirmed across all decision domains. The authors discuss implications from these results as they relate to theories of aging and health care policy.     

Self-reported use of different forms of aggression in late adolescence and emerging adulthood

Two studies investigated the psychometric properties of a self-report measure of commonly recognized forms of aggression (FOA) that could be used to efficiently gather aggression data in large samples. EFA and CFA in Study 1 suggested that a five-factor model (Physical, Property, Verbal, Relational, and Passive-Rational) best represented the data across high school and college students. However, factor analyses in Study 2 using an ethnically diverse university sample revealed a four-factor solution (combining Physical and Property items). As a confirmation of the construct validity of FOA, physical and property aggression were lower, and verbal and passive-rational aggression were higher in college versus high school students. Gender differences were observed across FOA subscales, except relational aggression. FOA subscales correlated as expected with other anger and personality scales. Overall, the data revealed adequate psychometric properties for the FOA and suggest that current category distinctions (e.g., direct-indirect) may not adequately account for different forms of aggression. Researchers may want to reevaluate these categories.     

Sensitivity and bias under conditions of equal and unequal academic task difficulty

We conducted an experimental analysis of children's relative problem-completion rates across two workstations under conditions of equal (Experiment 1) and unequal (Experiment 2) problem difficulty. Results were described using the generalized matching equation and were evaluated for degree of schedule versus stimulus control. Experiment 1 involved a symmetrical choice arrangement in which the children could earn points exchangeable for rewards contingent on correct math problem completion. Points were delivered according to signaled variable-interval schedules at each workstation. For 2 children, relative rates of problem completion appeared to have been controlled by the schedule requirements in effect and matched relative rates of reinforcement, with sensitivity values near 1 and bias values near 0. Experiment 2 involved increasing the difficulty of math problems at one of the workstations. Sensitivity values for all 3 participants were near 1, but a substantial increase in bias toward the easier math problems was observed. This bias was possibly associated with responding at the more difficult workstation coming under stimulus control rather than schedule control.     

Do children "DRM" like adults? False memory production in children

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was used to investigate developmental trends in accurate and false memory production. In Experiment 1, DRM lists adjusted to be more consistent with children's vocabulary were used with 2nd graders, 8th graders, and college students. Accurate and false recall and recognition increased with age, but semantic information appeared to be available to all age groups. Experiment 2 created a set of child-generated lists based on the free associations by a group of 3rd graders to critical items. The child-generated associates were different from those generated by adults; long and short versions of the child-generated lists were therefore presented to 2nd, 5th, and 8th graders and college students in Experiment 3. Second graders exhibited few false memories, whereas 5th graders were similar to adults in low-demand conditions and more similar to younger children in high-demand conditions. Findings are discussed in terms of developmental changes in automatic and effortful processing and the use of semantic networks.     

On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.     

How to Think about Fallibilism

Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only the connection between fallibility and error, but the connection between fallibility and accidental truth as well.