The persistence of welfare stigma: Does the passing of time and subsequent employment moderate the negative perceptions associated with unemployment benefit receipt?

People receiving welfare payments are stigmatized. However, previous studies of welfare recipient stereotypes have not examined whether the stigma endures after payments are no longer received and have rarely considered the stigma associated with specific categories of welfare payments. We examined whether welfare stigma endures in three experiments (total N = 873) focused on one category of welfare recipient, people receiving government income support due to their unemployment. To test if this stigmatized identity marked or scarred how people are perceived, we compared evaluations of currently unemployed benefit recipients to currently employed people who either previously received this benefit or who had no stated history of benefit receipt. Across the three experiments, we found that current recipients of unemployment benefits were evaluated as much less conscientious, less human, and poorer workers, but as somewhat more extraverted than currently employed individuals irrespective of their welfare history. Moreover, we found that currently employed individuals were evaluated similarly, regardless of whether they had a prior history of benefit receipt, and the recency of this prior benefit experience. This pattern of results suggests that receiving unemployment benefits does not scar how a person is perceived by others, but only temporarily marks how they are perceived. These findings suggest that welfare stigma may create an evaluative barrier to returning to work, but that if this barrier can be overcome there are no negative evaluations of former recipients’ character. Overall, community members seem accepting of prior benefit receipt once a person returns to work.     

Reasons,Coherence, and Group Rationality

If groups can have beliefs and other attitudes of their own, what determines which such attitudes the group rationally ought to have? A widespread presupposition is that group‐level beliefs should be a function of the beliefs of the group's members, and similarly for other attitudes. But a host of impossibility theorems show that no such aggregation function can satisfy intuitively attractive constraints while ensuring coherent group‐level attitudes. I argue that this presupposition is false. Group‐level attitudes should be a function of group‐level reasons (evidence, in the epistemic case), not individual‐level attitudes. This allows for a theory of group rationality that (i) bypasses a host of pessimistic results in the literature on judgment aggregation and (ii) treats rational individual‐level attitudes and rational group‐level attitudes in parallel.     

The benefits of collective responsibility: How ingroup reputation concern motivates prosociality in intergroup contexts

Collective responsibility processes have been investigated from the perspectives of the outgroup (e.g., collective blame) and the ingroup (e.g., collective guilt). This article extends theory and research on collective responsibility with a third perspective, namely that of the individual actor whose behavior triggers the attribution of collective blame. Four experiments (n = 78, 118, 208 and 77, respectively) tested the hypotheses that collective responsibility processes influence the individual actors' appraisals, emotions and behavior. The possibility of collective blame for their individual action prompted more prosocial behavior among participants (Experiment 1). Participants also experienced more ingroup reputation concern and in turn more negative emotions (Experiment 2–4) for a past wrongdoing if it could reflect negatively on the ingroup in the eyes of outgroups. The increased negative emotions then motivated participants to improve the ingroup's image (Experiment 4). The effects were moderated by perceived ingroup entitativity, in that activating collective blame increased ingroup reputation concern and negative emotions only for ingroups perceived as highly entitative (Experiment 3).     

The Effect of Group Polarization on Opposition to Donald Trump

Using focus groups, we examined support and opposition for Donald Trump prior to the 2016 presidential election. When ingroup members participate in discussion, this conversation alone typically strengthens and intensifies members’ initial attitudes. We used a pre‐ to post‐focus‐group questionnaire to assess attitudes toward Trump, his campaign, and policies. We argue that group polarization influenced people’s opinions about Trump such that attitudes became more extreme after discussion with like‐minded individuals. We report changes for Trump nonsupporters for which group polarization occurred on attitudes toward illegal immigration, political correctness, the military, women, and veterans after the group discussion. For each, level of support for Trump’s views decreased. To further explore potential psychological mechanisms associated with group polarization, we employed network science methods to examine the structure of the language associated with these issues and identify potential drivers of attitude change. Results provide some support for a common mechanism for group polarization, which may be driven by language dynamics specific to individual attitudes.     

Youth Cognitive Empowerment: Development and Evaluation of an Instrument

Psychological empowerment (PE) is a multicomponent construct that involves the mechanisms through which people and groups gain control over their lives and environments. Psychological empowerment has previously been operationalized using measures of sociopolitical control among young people, with findings indicating links between PE and other positive developmental outcomes. Sociopolitical control, however, is only an indicator for the emotional component of PE. Research has largely neglected the cognitive component of PE, particularly in studies of younger people. In fact, few studies to date have presented and empirically tested measurement instruments for the cognitive component of PE among youth. In this study, we adapted a measure, which previously had been validated and used among adults, for use among young people and tested it in a sample of high school students (53% female, 75% Hispanic) in an urban school in the northeastern U.S. Confirmatory factor analyses were used to assess the hypothesized three‐factor structure of cognitive empowerment, and the measure was examined for association with the construct of social justice orientation. Results indicate an adequate fit for the second‐order factor, and an expected relationship with the related construct.     

What Makes Hypocrisy? Folk Definitions,Attitude/Behavior Combinations,Attitude Strength,and Private/Public Distinctions

Past research has rarely examined what makes behaviors appear more or less hypocritical. This work expands our understanding, identifying and exploring factors contributing to perception of hypocrisy. An initial study surveyed participants’ definitions of the concept. Experiments 2a/2b then demonstrate that attitude–behavior inconsistency is viewed as most hypocritical, followed by attitude-attitude and behavior-behavior inconsistency. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how perception of hypocrisy depends on attitude strength, communication method, and whether attitudes/behaviors are privately or publicly held/enacted. We conclude that hypocrisy is perceived as strongest when attitudes are publicly imposed on others in an attempt to appear morally superior.     

The response-signal method reveals age-related changes in object working memory

Sixteen healthy young adults (ages 18-32) and 16 healthy older adults (ages 67-81) completed a delayed response task in which they saw the following visual sequence: memory stimuli (2 abstract shapes; 3,000 ms), a blank delay (5,000 ms), a probe stimulus of variable duration (one abstract shape; 125, 250, 500, 1,000, or 2,000 ms), and a mask (500 ms). Subjects decided whether the probe stimulus matched either of the memory stimuli; they were instructed to respond during the mask, placing greater emphasis on speed than accuracy. The authors used D. L. Hintzman & T. Curran's (1994) 3-parameter compound bounded exponential model of speed-accuracy tradeoff to describe changes in discriminability associated with total processing time. Group-level analysis revealed a higher rate parameter and a higher asymptote parameter for the young adult group, but no difference across groups in x-intercept. Proxy measures of cognitive reserve (Y. Stern et al., 2005) predicted the rate parameter value, particularly in older adults. Results suggest that in working memory, aging impairs both the maximum capacity for discriminability and the rate of information accumulation, but not the temporal threshold for discriminability.     

The role of money in the excitement of gambling

Many gamblers claim that gambling is intrinsically exciting, with money playing only a secondary role. To examine the effects of the expectancy of winning money, the authors randomly assigned 243 male college student gamblers to 1 of 6 experimental or 1 of 3 control conditions. Control participants either simply watched a videotaped horse race or they picked a horse, but without wagering; that horse later turned out to be either the winner of the race or the runner-up. Experimental participants wagered $1 on a horse for a chance of winning either USD 2, USD 7, or USD 15, with half winning and half losing their wagers. Wagering led to increased heart rates and subjective excitement as a function of the expected payoff and of winning as opposed to losing the wager. The study was replicated with 200 female college student gamblers with similar results. These findings support the notion that the excitement of gambling is tied to the expectancy of winning money.     

Mindfulness,Self-Esteem,and Unconditional Self-Acceptance

Ellis (Ellis, A. (1996), Psychotherapy, 22(1), 149–151) has been a longstanding critic of the concept of self-esteem and has offered the notion of unconditional self-acceptance as an alternative. Other researchers have suggested that cultivating mindfulness––attention directed towards one’s immediate experiences with an attitude of non-judgment––also offers a healthier alternative to self-esteem (Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K. W. (2003) Psychological Inquiry, 14(1), 71–76). This study examined the relationship between mindfulness, self-esteem, and unconditional self-acceptance. A sample of 167 university students completed two measures of everyday mindfulness, and measures of self-esteem and unconditional self-acceptance. Positive correlations were found between mindfulness, self-esteem, and unconditional self-acceptance. Mindfulness skills may offer a means to cultivate unconditional self-acceptance and to shift from an emphasis on self-esteem as a measure of worth. This paper was based on data collected for the first author's Master's project.     

Guided saccades modulate face- and body-sensitive activation in the occipitotemporal cortex during social perception

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has identified distinct brain regions in ventral occipitotemporal cortex (VOTC) and lateral occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC) that are differentially activated by pictures of faces and bodies. Recent work from our laboratory has shown that the strong LOTC activation evoked by bodies in which the face is occluded is attenuated when the occlusion is removed. We hypothesized that this attenuation may occur because subjects preferentially fixate upon faces when present in the scene. Here, we experimentally manipulated subjects’ fixations while they viewed a static picture of a character whose face, hand, and torso were continuously visible throughout each run. The subject’s saccades and fixations were guided by a small fixation cross that made discrete jumps to a new location every 500 ms. Subjects were instructed to follow the fixation cross and make a button press whenever it changed size. In a series of blocks, the fixation cross shifted from locations on the face, on the hand, and to locations on a background image of a phase-scrambled face. In a second study, the fixation cross moved similarly, but the hand locations were changed to locations along the character’s body or torso. A localizer task was used to identify face- and body-sensitive regions of LOTC. Body-sensitive regions were strongly activated when the subjects’ saccades were guided over the character’s torso relative to when the saccades were guided over the character’s face. Little to no activity occurred in the body-sensitive region of LOTC when the subjects’ saccades were guided over the character’s hand. The localizer task was unable to differentiate body-sensitive regions in lateral VOTC from face-sensitive regions, or body-sensitive regions in medial VOTC from flower-sensitive regions. Guided saccades over the body strongly activated both lateral and medial VOTC. These results provide new insights into the function of body-sensitive visual areas in both LOTC and VOTC, and illustrate the potential confounding influence of uncontrolled eye movements for neuroimaging studies of social perception.