Response to two presentations of the Sentence Completion Test of ego development

This was a study of the differences among individuals on their performance on oral and written versions of the Washington University Sentence Completion Test of ego development. The study included 192 subjects from three age groups: College age, community residents, and retired people. No oral versus written differences were found in scores. Gender was the only factor to exhibit a consistently significant effect on Sentence Completion Test score differences.     

Updating Norman's "Adequate Taxonomy": intelligence and personality dimensions in natural language and in questionnaires

Research on the dimensions of personality represented in the English language has repeatedly led to the identification of five factors (Norman, 1963). An alternative classification of personality traits, based on analyses of standardized questionnaires, is provided by the NEO (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness) model (Costa & McCrae, 1980b). In this study we examined the correspondence between these two systems in order to evaluate their comprehensiveness as models of personality. A sample of 498 men and women, participants in a longitudinal study of aging, completed an instrument containing 80 adjective pairs, which included 40 pairs proposed by Goldberg to measure the five dimensions. Neuroticism and extraversion factors from these items showed substantial correlations with corresponding NEO Inventory scales; however, analyses that included psychometric measures of intelligence suggested that the fifth factor in the Norman structure should be reconceptualized as openness to experience. Convergent correlations above .50 with spouse ratings on the NEO Inventory that were made three years earlier confirmed these relations across time, instrument, and source of data. We discuss the relations among culture, conscientiousness, openness, and intelligence, and we conclude that mental ability is a separate factor, though related to openness to experience.     

Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: an analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities

Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, and Hepburn (1980) assert that subjects fall prey to the base-rate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments. They found that subjects ignored their stereotypes when trait judgments were made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. The present article reexamines those findings with respect to two issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with subjects' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs. individual) of subjects' judgments. We conducted a replication of the Locksley et al. (1980) Study 2, and the results were examined with respect to these two issues. We found no support for the base-rate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each subject based on the subject's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that subjects ignored or underused their stereotypes as the base-rate fallacy predicts.     

Evaluation of the BSRI masculine and feminine items using desirability and stereotype ratings

This study empirically tested Bem's (1974) assumption that the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales measure sex-typed standards of desirable behavior for men and women in American society. The adequacy of items in the two scales was evaluated by Bem's (1974) criteria using two types of desirability and stereotype ratings. Results obtained in all the experimental conditions except one involving Bem's desirability instructions and Bem's rating scale did not support the tested assumption. Implications of these results for revising the BSRI scales were discussed.     

Learned helplessness and judgments of control

One of the central hypotheses of learned helplessness theory is that exposure to noncontingency produces a reduced ability to perceive response-outcome relations (the postulated "cognitive deficit"). To test this hypothesis, subjects were exposed to a typical helplessness induction task and then asked to make judgments of the amount of control their responses exerted over a designated outcome (the onset of a light). Support for the postulated cognitive deficit would be found if subjects who experienced the induction underestimated the relation between their responses and outcomes. The results, however, demonstrated that induction subjects (n = 30) made higher and more accurate judgments of control than subjects in a no-treatment control group (n = 30). This finding clearly fails to support the postulated cognitive deficit and highlights the need for other direct tests of the basic hypotheses of helplessness theory.