Long-Term Neuropsychological Outcomes of Childhood Onset Acute Disseminated Encephalomyelitis (ADEM): a Meta-Analysis

The long-term neurocognitive prognosis of childhood onset acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM) is unclear. This review and quantitative synthesis of the available literature examined whether there are long-term impacts of childhood ADEM on neurocognitive functioning. A search of online databases (MEDLINE, EMBASE, EBSCO CINAHL, PsycINFO and the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews) from their inception to October 2015 and reference lists identified 13 papers eligible for inclusion in the systematic review; seven of these were eligible for inclusion in meta-analyses. The systematic review indicated that, at a group level there is a positive long-term neuropsychological outcome from childhood onset ADEM. However, despite the apparent absence of long-term negative impacts of ADEM at a group level, at an individual level impairments in the areas of IQ, attention, executive functioning, processing speed, learning and memory, visuospatial skills and internalising symptoms were found in up to 43% of patients when aggregated across the studies. No significant negative effect of ADEM for any of the neuropsychological domains examined was found in meta-analyses. However, the effects for Processing Speed (r _mean = ?0.296 (CI 95% = ?0.605-0.013)) and Internalising symptoms (r _mean = 0.242 (CI 95% = ?0.014-0.564)) approached significance (p = 0.06), suggesting a trend towards ADEM leading to long-term reduced processing speed and elevated internalising symptoms. Together, our findings suggest that despite a generally positive neurocognitive outcome post childhood ADEM there are a subset of individuals who can suffer from ongoing specific cognitive impairments. Clinical implications and research priorities are discussed.     

Does a rat release a soaked conspecific due to empathy?

In Experiment 1, rats choosing in an E maze preferred to release a rat standing in a pool of water to dry ground over a rat already standing on dry ground. Five additional experiments showed that the choosing rat’s preference for releasing the wet rat was maintained by two separable outcomes: (1) the social contact offered by the released rat and (2) the reinforcing value of proximity to a pool of water. These results call into question Sato et al.’s (Anim Cogn 18:1039–1047, 2015) claim to have demonstrated that a rat’s releasing of a wet rat to dry ground is empathically motivated.     

Associative independence revisited: competition between conflicting associations can be resolved or even reversed in one trial

In one type of association-memory paradigm, after studying pairs of the form AB, AC, participants must recall both B and C in response to A. Counterintuitively, yet often replicated, recall probabilities of B and C are typically uncorrelated (“associative independence”). This face-value independence is now understood to reflect a negative correlation due to AB and AC competing, approximately offset by a positive correlation produced by subject- and item-variability. The outcome might vary with stimulus material; for noun-pairs, and with a single study trial per pair, AB and AC have been found to be positively correlated. We replicated the positive correlation between AB and AC for noun-pairs, but this did not differ from the correlation expected for independent memory tests, suggesting that for noun pairs, AB and AC are independent on average. In Experiment 2, participants instructed to form separate images for AB and AC again produced an independence pattern, but participants instructed to combine AB and AC into an integrative image produced a facilitation pattern. Thus, the relationship between AB and AC varies, and can be influenced by study strategy. Association-memory models may need to accommodate a diverse range of AB–AC relationships, and studies that build on AB/AC learning may need to consider whether AB/AC start out with a competitive, facilitatory or independent relationship.     

Why bioethics cannot figure out what to do with race

Race and religion are integral parts of bioethics. Harm and oppression, with the aim of social and political control, have been wrought in the name of religion against Blacks and people of color as embodied in the Ten Commandments, the Inquisition, and in the history of the Holy Crusades. Missionaries came armed with Judeo/Christian beliefs went to nations of people of color who had their own belief systems and forced change and caused untold harms because the indigenous belief systems were incompatible with their own. The indigenous people were denounced as ungodly, pagan, uncivilized, and savage. Hence, laws were enacted because of their perceived need to structure a sense of morality and to create and build a culture for these indigenous people of color. To date bioethics continues to be informed by a Western worldview that is Judeo/Christian in belief and orientation. However, missing from bioethical discourse in America is the historical influence of the Black Church as a cultural repository, which continues to influence the culture of Africans and Blacks. Cultural aspects of peoples of color are still largely ignored today. In attempting to deal with issues of race while steering clear of the religious and cultural impact of the Black Church, bioethics finds itself in the middle of a distressing situation: it simply cannot figure out what to do with race.     

Dissociating positive and negative influences of verbal processing on the recognition of pictures of faces and objects

Four experiments investigated the role of verbal processing in the recognition of pictures of faces and objects. We used (a) a stimulus-encoding task where participants learned sequentially presented pictures in control, articulatory suppression, and describe conditions and then engaged in an old-new picture recognition test and (b) a poststimulus-encoding task where participants learned the stimuli without any secondary task and then either described or not a single item from memory before the recognition test. The main findings were as follows: First, verbalization influenced picture recognition. Second, there were contrasting influences of verbalization on the recognition of faces, compared with objects, that were driven by (a) the stage of processing during which verbalization took place (as assessed by the stimulus-encoding and poststimulus-encoding tasks), (b) whether verbalization was subvocal (whereby one goes through the motions of speaking but without making any sound) or overt, and (c) stimulus familiarity. During stimulus encoding there was a double dissociation whereby subvocal verbalization interfered with the recognition of faces but not objects, while overt verbalization benefited the recognition of objects but not faces. In addition, stimulus familiarity provided an independent and beneficial influence on performance. Post stimulus encoding, overt verbalization interfered with the recognition of both faces and objects, and this interference was apparent for unfamiliar but not familiar stimuli. Together these findings extend work on verbalization to picture recognition and place important parameters on stimulus and task constraints that contribute to contrasting beneficial and detrimental effects of verbalization on recognition memory.     

Tolerance for distorted faces: Challenges to a configural processing account of familiar face recognition

Face recognition is widely held to rely on ‘configural processing’, an analysis of spatial relations between facial features. We present three experiments in which viewers were shown distorted faces, and asked to resize these to their correct shape. Based on configural theories appealing to metric distances between features, we reason that this should be an easier task for familiar than unfamiliar faces (whose subtle arrangements of features are unknown). In fact, participants were inaccurate at this task, making between 8% and 13% errors across experiments. Importantly, we observed no advantage for familiar faces: in one experiment participants were more accurate with unfamiliars, and in two experiments there was no difference. These findings were not due to general task difficulty – participants were able to resize blocks of colour to target shapes (squares) more accurately. We also found an advantage of familiarity for resizing other stimuli (brand logos). If configural processing does underlie face recognition, these results place constraints on the definition of ‘configural’. Alternatively, familiar face recognition might rely on more complex criteria – based on tolerance to within-person variation rather than highly specific measurement.     

Faces retain attention

In the present study, we investigated whether faces have an advantage in retaining attention over other stimulus categories. In three experiments, subjects were asked to focus on a central go/no-go signal before classifying a concurrently presented peripheral line target. In Experiment 1, the go/no-go signal could be superimposed on photographs of upright famous faces, matching inverted faces, or meaningful objects. Experiments 2 and 3 tested upright and inverted unfamiliar faces, printed names, and another class of meaningful objects in an identical design. A fourth experiment provided a replication of Experiment 1, but with a 1,000-msec stimulus onset asynchrony between the onset of the central face/nonface stimuli and the peripheral targets. In all the experiments, the presence of an upright face significantly delayed target response times, in comparison with each of the other stimulus categories. These results suggest a general attentional bias, so that it is particularly difficult to disengage processing resources from faces.     

Cross-domain Repetition Priming in Person Recognition

Three experiments examining repetition priming of personal names are reported. In each experiment, faces are used as prime stimuli and people's names as the test stimuli. Experiment 1 fails to demonstrate priming from faces to names when the same task-a familiar/ unfamiliar judgement-is made in prime and test phases. Experiment 2 shows that priming is observed when the same semantic judgement (British/ American) is made in prime and test phases. Experiment 3 shows that priming is observed when different semantic judgements (dead/ alive, British/ American) are made at prime and test phase. These results suggest that transfer appropriate processing cannot provide the sole account of repetition priming in person recognition. Instead, the results are interpreted in terms of a structural account of priming, embedded within an interactive activation and competition model of person recognition.     

The effect of age on relative timing variability and transfer

The purpose of this study was to investigate potential qualitative differences in relative timing across age both within and across speed conditions. Forty right-handed males performed 48 trials of a five-component coincident-timing task at one speed and then 16 more at a different speed. The independent variables were age (5-7, 8-10, 11-13 years, and adult), speed (slow and fast), and block order (training and transfer). The results indicated that within-speed relative timing consistency improved with increasing age for movement-time and pause-time components, while across-speed transfer improved with age only for pause time. movement velocity emerged as a more stable timing parameter than movement time across speeds for all groups. The last movement-time component correlated highly with the total response times, suggesting that coincident-timing accuracy was controlled to a large degree by a final, fine-tuning correction. These results imply that developmental deficits in relative timing increase the attention demands of a given task, thereby reducing a child's capacity to concurrently control his movements and monitor events in the environment.     

Perceptual priming is not a necessary consequence of semantic classification of pictures

Four experiments investigated how repetition priming of object recognition is affected by the task performed in the prime and test phases. In Experiment 1 object recognition was tested using both vocal naming and two different semantic decision tasks (whether or not objects were manufactured, and whether or not they would be found inside the house). Some aspects of the data were inconsistent with contemporary models of object recognition. Specifically, object priming was eliminated with some combinations of prime and test tasks, and there was no evidence of perceptual (as opposed to conceptual or response) priming in either semantic classification task, even though perceptual identification of the objects is required for at least one of these tasks. Experiment 2 showed that even when perceptual demands were increased by brief presentation, the inside task showed no perceptual priming. Experiment 3 showed that the inside task did not appear to be based on conceptual priming either, as it was not primed significantly when the prime decisions were made to object labels. Experiment 4 showed that visual sensitivity could be restored to the inside task following practice on the task, supporting the suggestion that a critical factor is whether the semantic category is preformed or must be computed. The results show that the visual representational processes revealed by object priming depend crucially on the task chosen.