Specific exemplar retention and prototype abstraction in young and old adults

The effects of age differences in retention of information about specific concept members on the ability to abstract central tendency information were examined. Young and older adults were presented with a series of visual patterns that were organized around a prototype. They were then presented with these same patterns plus a set of new patterns varying in prototype similarity in a recognition test. It was found that young adults retained more information about specific acquisition set exemplars, which resulted in slightly different recognition responses for new patterns. However, the recognition behavior of both young and older adults appeared to be governed by the same rules. It is suggested that the organization of conceptual information does not change with age, but the poorer retention of specific item information in older adults may result in a less complete representation.     

Age-related variation in the influences of aging stereotypes on memory in adulthood

Adults 24-86 years of age read positive or negative information about aging and memory prior to a memory test. The impact of this information on recall performance varied with age. Performance in the youngest and oldest participants was minimally affected by stereotype activation. Adults in their 60s exhibited weak effects consistent with the operation of stereotype threat, whereas middle-age adults exhibited a contrast effect in memory performance, suggestive of stereotype lift. Beliefs about aging and memory were also affected by stereotypic information, and older adults' changed beliefs were more important in predicting performance than was exposure to stereotype-based information alone.     

Does anxiety affect children's reports of memory for a stressful event?

The study was conducted to explore the effects of anxiety on children's memory for a naturalistic, potentially stressful event. Eighty children of two age groups, 4-5 and 7-8 years, visited the dentist for either a teeth-cleaning check-up or an operative procedure. Anxiety was assessed by a behavioural rating scale, as well as through Likert-scale ratings by the hygienist, parent, and child. Memory for the event was elicited through free recall and specific central and peripheral questions. High anxiety had a debilitative effect on the reports of the older children, but not on young children's reports. However, experience with the dental event mediated the influence of age and anxiety on memory. Although all measures of anxiety were significantly associated with each other, only the behavioural rating scale yielded statistically reliable effects of anxiety on memory. The anxiety-memory relationship is believed to be more complex than previous research with children suggests.     

To deliberate or not to deliberate: Interactions between age,task characteristics,and cognitive activity on decision making

The effects of aging and deliberative activities on decision making were examined. In two separate tasks, young, middle‐aged, and older adults were presented with four alternatives and given instructions to choose the best one. Following study, participants were either given additional time to think about their decision or were prevented from doing so. Decision quality did not benefit from additional deliberative activity when the structure of the stimuli facilitated fluent online processing. In contrast, deliberation promoted performance when such processing was more difficult. In addition, those individuals who focused on attribute information relevant to the decision context performed better than those who did not. Age differences in performance were minimal, but older adults with lower levels of education or cognitive ability tended to perform worse than the rest of the sample under conditions where deliberative skills were required to promote performance. The results are inconsistent with recent proposals regarding the benefits of passive deliberation. In addition, the results support the general assertion that the age effects in decision making will be most evident in situations dependent upon deliberative skills. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The free will of corporations (and other collectives)

Moderate holists like French (Collective and corporate responsibility, 1984), Copp (J Soc Philos, 38(3):369–388, 2007), Hess (The Background of Social Reality – A Survey, 2013), Isaacs (Moral responsibility in collective contexts, 2011) and List and Pettit (Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that corporations cannot qualify as moral agents because they lack free will. The concern is that corporations (and other highly organized collectives like colleges, governments, and the military) are effectively puppets, dancing on strings controlled by external forces. The article begins by briefly presenting a novel account of corporate moral agency and then demonstrates that, on this account, qualifying corporations (and similar entities in other fields) do possess free will. Such entities possess and act from their own “actional springs”, in Haji’s (Midwest Stud Philos, 30(1):292–308, 2006) phrase, and from their own reasons-responsive mechanisms. When they do so, they act freely and are morally responsible for what they do.     

Forum: A New Culture of Learning

These brief essays by Mary Hess, Eugene Gallagher, and Katherine Turpin are solicited responses from three different contexts to the provocative book by Douglas Thomas and John Seely Brown, The New Culture of Learning (2011). Mary Hess writes from a seminary context, providing a critical summary of the authors' major concepts and their ramifications, positive and negative, for theological education and the church. Eugene Gallagher writes from a liberal arts setting, identifying characteristics of the face‐to‐face classroom that would go missing in a careless adoption of online learning environments. Finally, Katherine Turpin reports from the classroom, chronicling her experience in a course she redesigned for a graduate theological setting to employ some of the authors' pedagogical principles and strategies. Together, these responses offer critical appreciation and constructive critique of the work Thomas and Seely Brown have done – and point the conversation forward.     

Emotional Mimicry: Why and When We Mimic Emotions

The goal of this review was to provide a brief overview of recent developments in the domain of emotional mimicry research. We argue that emotional signals are intrinsically meaningful within a social relationship, which is crucial for understanding the functionality and boundary conditions of emotional mimicry. On the basis of a review of the literature on facial mimicry of emotion displays, we conclude that the classic matched motor hypothesis does not hold for emotional mimicry. We alternatively propose a contextual view of emotional mimicry, which states that emotional mimicry depends on the social context: we only mimic emotional signals that are interpreted to promote affiliation goals and not necessarily what we see. As a further consequence, we are less likely to mimic strangers and we do not mimic people we do not like nor emotions that signal antagonism.