Self‐Directed Learning Favors Local,Rather Than Global,Uncertainty

Collecting (or “sampling”) information that one expects to be useful is a powerful way to facilitate learning. However, relatively little is known about how people decide which information is worth sampling over the course of learning. We describe several alternative models of how people might decide to collect a piece of information inspired by “active learning” research in machine learning. We additionally provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating the situations under which these models are empirically distinguishable, and we report a novel empirical study that exploits these insights. Our model‐based analysis of participants' information gathering decisions reveals that people prefer to select items which resolve uncertainty between two possibilities at a time rather than items that have high uncertainty across all relevant possibilities simultaneously. Rather than adhering to strictly normative or confirmatory conceptions of information search, people appear to prefer a “local” sampling strategy, which may reflect cognitive constraints on the process of information gathering.     

The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

Visual size perception and haptic calibration during development

It is still unclear how the visual system perceives accurately the size of objects at different distances. One suggestion, dating back to Berkeley’s famous essay, is that vision is calibrated by touch. If so, we may expect different mechanisms involved for near, reachable distances and far, unreachable distances. To study how the haptic system calibrates vision we measured size constancy in children (from 6 to 16 years of age) and adults, at various distances. At all ages, accuracy of the visual size perception changes with distance, and is almost veridical inside the haptic workspace, in agreement with the idea that the haptic system acts to calibrate visual size perception. Outside this space, systematic errors occurred, which varied with age. Adults tended to overestimate visual size of distant objects (over‐compensation for distance), while children younger than 14 underestimated their size (under‐compensation). At 16 years of age there seemed to be a transition point, with veridical perception of distant objects. When young subjects were allowed to touch the object inside the haptic workspace, the visual biases disappeared, while older subjects showed multisensory integration. All results are consistent with the idea that the haptic system can be used to calibrate visual size perception during development, more effectively within than outside the haptic workspace, and that the calibration mechanisms are different in children than in adults.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.