The effect of corpus size in predicting reaction time in a basic word recognition task: Moving on from Kučera and Francis

Word frequency is one of the strongest determiners of reaction time (RT) in word recognition tasks; it is an important theoretical and methodological variable. The Ku?era and Francis (1967) word frequency count (derived from the 1-million-word Brown corpus) is used by most investigators concerned with the issue of word frequency. Word frequency estimates from the Brown corpus were compared with those from a 131-million-word corpus (the HAL corpus; conversational text gathered from Usenet) in a standard word naming task with 32 subjects. RT was predicted equally well by both corpora for high-frequency words, but the larger corpus provided better predictors for low- and medium-frequency words. Furthermore, the larger corpus provides estimates for 97,261 lexical items; the smaller corpus, for 50,406 items.     

Facilitated Communication as an Ideomotor Response

Forty college students were taught facilitated communication via a commercially available training videotape. They were then asked to facilitate the communication of a confederate, who was described as developmentally disabled and unable to speak. All 40 participants produced responses that they attributed at least partially to the confederate, and most attributed all of the communication entirely to her. Eighty-nine percent produced responses corresponding to information they had received, most of which was unknown to the confederate. Responding was significantly correlated with simple ideomotor responses with a pendulum and was not affected by information about the controversy surrounding facilitated communication. These data support the hypothesis that facilitated communication is an instance of automatic writing, akin to that observed in hypothesis and with Ouija boards, and that the ability to produce automatic writing is more common than previously thought.     

How are pictures registered in memory?

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that pictorial memory is much less dependent on rehearsal than is verbal memory. Experiment I examined incidental learning since this is assumed to reflect learning with little or no rehearsal. Following a classification task, intentional and incidental learning for pictures and for words was compared. The superiority of pictorial memory was especially marked in incidental learning. Experiment II showed that this result was not due to differences in the amount of processing required to classify pictures and words. RTs to classify words and pictures did not differ, and incidental learning was again superior for pictures. In Experiment III rehearsal opportunity was restricted by a concurrent task during presentation of word and picture lists, and the decrement was very much greater for word learning than for picture learning. It was concluded that manipulation of rehearsal opportunity has relatively little effect on pictorial memory.     

Perceptual Load Induces Inattentional Blindness in Drivers

Perceptual load theory states that the level of perceptual load in a task predicts the processing of task‐irrelevant information. High perceptual load has been shown to result in increased inattentional blindness; however, there is little evidence that this extends beyond artificial computer‐based tasks to real‐world behavior. In this study, we adapted a typical load‐blindness paradigm for use in a driving simulator. Forty‐two drivers performed a series of gap perception tasks where they judged if their vehicle could fit between two parked vehicles, with the task imposing either low or high perceptual load. Awareness for an unexpected pedestrian or animal at the side of the road was found to be significantly lower in the high perceptual load condition. This study is the first to demonstrate perceptual load effects on awareness in an applied setting and has important implications for road safety and future applied research on the perceptual load model.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and theory of mind

Various theoretical accounts propose that an important developmental relation exists between joint attention, play, and imitation abilities, and later theory of mind ability. However, very little direct empirical evidence supports these claims for putative “precursor” theory of mind status. A small sample (N=13) of infants, for whom measures of play, joint attention, and imitation had been collected at 20 months of age, was followed-up longitudinally at 44 months and a battery of theory of mind measures was conducted. Language and IQ were measured at both timepoints. Imitation ability at 20 months was longitudinally associated with expressive, but not receptive, language ability at 44 months. In contrast, only the joint attention behaviours of gaze switches between an adult and an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal detection task at 20 months were longitudinally associated with theory of mind ability at 44 months. It is argued that joint attention, play, and imitation, and language and theory of mind, might form part of a shared social–communicative representational system in infancy that becomes increasingly specialised and differentiated as development progresses.