Remembering past emotions: The role of current appraisals

This research assessed the stability of memory for emotions over time, and the relationship between current appraisals and memory for emotions. A week after the televised announcement of the verdict in the criminal trial of Mr Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson, participants were asked to describe their emotional reactions and their appraisals when they first learned of the verdict. After a delay of two months, and again after more than a year, participants recalled their initial emotional reactions and described their current appraisals of the verdict. After two months, the more participants' appraisals of Mr Simpson's innocence or guilt had changed, the less stable were their memories for the intensities of happiness and anger. After two months, and after more than a year, systematic changes in memory for happiness, anger, and surprise were found in directions consistent with current appraisals. These findings replicate and extend the findings of Levine (1997), and suggest that memories for emotional responses are partially reconstructed based on current appraisals of events.     

The effects of environmental change on chicks' responses to a familiar stimulus

The purpose of the present experiments was to explore chicks' proximity seeking behaviour in relation to imprinting objects in unfamiliar settings. Experiment I showed that chicks, which were individually imprinted on a stationary imprinting object, displayed reduced proximity seeking behaviour when tested in a pen smaller than the rearing pen. This finding confirmed earlier work on the effects of changed pen size. Experiment II used continuous and intermittent noise rearing and testing conditions, in all possible combinations, and a stationary imprinting object. Increased proximity seeking was found in conditions where the auditory environment was changed from rearing to testing, a result apparently opposite to that obtained in earlier work. It is suggested that the effect of environmental change on proximity seeking may vary with the modality in which change occurs and the salience of the imprinting object.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.