Learning concepts and categories: is spacing the "enemy of induction"?

Inductive learning -- that is, learning a new concept or category by observing exemplars -- happens constantly, for example, when a baby learns a new word or a doctor classifies x-rays. What influence does the spacing of exemplars have on induction? Compared with massing, spacing enhances long-term recall, but we expected spacing to hamper induction by making the commonalities that define a concept or category less apparent. We asked participants to study multiple paintings by different artists, with a given artist's paintings presented consecutively (massed) or interleaved with other artists' paintings (spaced). We then tested induction by asking participants to indicate which studied artist (Experiments 1a and 1b) or whether any studied artist (Experiment 2) painted each of a series of new paintings. Surprisingly, induction profited from spacing, even though massing apparently created a sense of fluent learning: Participants rated massing as more effective than spacing, even after their own test performance had demonstrated the opposite.     

When intended remembering leads to unintended forgetting

As a means of clarifying the memory dynamics that underlie retrieval-induced forgetting, we explored how instructing participants either to remember or to forget a previously presented list of items influences the susceptibility of those items to inhibition. According to the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting, it is the items that interfere most with retrieval practice that should be the most susceptible to the effects of inhibition. Consistent with this prediction, items from lists that participants were told to remember suffered from significantly more retrieval-induced forgetting than did items from lists that participants were told to forget.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting: Evidence for a recall-specific mechanism

Previous work has shown that recalling information from long-term memory can impair the long-term retention of related representations—a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). We report an experiment in which the question of whether retrieval is necessary to induce this form of impairment was examined. All the subjects studied six members from each of eight taxonomic categories (e.g.,fruit orange). In the competitive practice condition, the subjects practiced recalling three of the six members, using category-stem cues (e.g.,fruit or____). In the noncompetitive practice condition, the subjects were reexposed to these same members for the same number of repetitions but were asked to recall the category name by using the exemplar and a stem as cues (e.g.,fr____orange). Despite significant and comparable facilitation of practiced items in both conditions, only the competitive practice subjects were impaired in their ability to recall the nonpracticed members on a delayed cued-recall test. These findings argue that retrieval-induced forgetting is not caused by increased competition arising from the strengthening of practiced items, but by inhibitory processes specific to the situation of recall.     

Intentional forgetting can increase,not decrease,residual influences of to-be-forgotten information

Intentionally forgotten information remains in memory at essentially full strength, as measured by recognition and priming, but access to that information is impaired, as measured by recall. Given that pattern, it seemed plausible that intentionally forgotten information might have a greater impact on certain subsequent judgments than would intentionally remembered information. In 2 experiments, participants cued to forget nonfamous names were subsequently more likely to make false attributions of fame to those names than were participants instructed to remember them. These findings implicate retrieval inhibition as a potent factor in the interplay of recollection and priming in memory and judgment. They also point to possible unintended consequences of instructions to forget, suppress, or disregard in legal or social settings.     

Influences of intentional and unintentional forgetting on false memories

In 2 experiments, we examined the interplay of 2 types of memory errors: forgetting and false memory--errors of omission and commission, respectively. We examined the effects of 2 manipulations known to inhibit retrieval of studied words--directed forgetting and part-list cuing--on the false recall of an unstudied "critical" word following study of its 15 strongest associates. Participants cued to forget the 1st of 2 studied lists before studying the 2nd recalled fewer List 1 words but intruded the missing critical word more often than did participants cued to remember both lists. By contrast, providing some studied words as cues during recall reduced both recall of the remaining studied words and intrusions of the critical word. The results suggest that forgetting can increase or decrease false memories, depending on whether such forgetting reflects impaired access to an entire episode or retrieval competition among elements of an episode.     

The promise and perils of self-regulated study

Self-regulated study involves many decisions, some of which people make confidently and easily (if not always optimally) and others of which are involved and difficult. Good study decisions rest on accurate monitoring of ongoing learning, a realistic mental model of how learning happens, and appropriate use of study strategies. We review our research on the decisions people make, for better or worse, when deciding what to study, how long to study, and how to study.     

Explaining retrieval-induced forgetting: A change in mental context between the study and restudy practice phases is not sufficient to cause forgetting

Retrieving information can impair the subsequent recall of related information. Such retrieval-induced forgetting is often attributed to inhibitory mechanisms, but Jonker, MacLeod, and Seli (2013) recently proposed an alternative account. In their view, the study and retrieval-practice phases constitute two disparate contexts, and impairment of unpractised members from practised categories is attributable to their being absent from the retrieval-practice context, which is where, according to Jonker et al., participants preferentially search at the time of final test. In evidence of this account, Jonker et al. showed that even restudy practice—which is assumed by the inhibitory account to be insufficient to cause forgetting (i.e., retrieval-specificity)—can cause forgetting when a mental context change is inserted between study and restudy. The present research sought to replicate this finding while also testing the possibility that a far mental context change would cause more forgetting than a near mental context change. In Experiment 1, participants described a vacation inside the United States (near) or outside the United States (far). In Experiments 2 and 3, participants described the layout of their own home (near) or their parents’ home (far). In contrast to the predictions of the context account, however, but consistent with the predictions of the inhibitory account, none of the restudy-plus-context-change conditions resulted in significant forgetting.