Dopaminergic modulation of the persistence of one-trial hippocampus-dependent memory

The persistence of new memory traces in the hippocampus, encoded following appropriate activation of glutamatergic receptors and the induction of synaptic plasticity, can be influenced by heterosynaptic activation of neuromodulatory brain systems. We therefore investigated the effects of a hippocampus-specific blockade of dopamine D1/D5 receptors on the persistence of spatial memory encoded in one trial using a delayed matching-to-place (DMP) task in a watermaze in which rats learn a new escape location each day. A within-subjects design was used such that both short (20 min) and long (6 h) retention intervals, and both drug (SCH23390, a D1/D5 receptor antagonist) and vehicle (aCSF) infusions were tested on different days in the same animals. Bilateral intrahippocampal infusion of SCH23390 (5 microg in 1 microL per side) prior to trial 1 (encoding) caused a differential impairment as a function of memory delay-with no effect during trial 2 (memory retrieval) after a 20-min interval, but a block of memory at 6 h. Further experiments revealed that infusion of SCH23390 immediately after trial 1 had no effect on retention 6 h later, and the poor memory seen at long retention intervals when the drug was present at encoding was not due to a state-dependent failure of retrieval. These results suggest that activation of D1/D5 receptors during memory encoding is necessary for the formation of a persistent memory trace in the hippocampus. The complementary effects of D1/D5 receptor blockade on the persistence of LTP and the duration of memory are consistent with the idea that changes in synaptic strength underlie memory.     

Automaticity and voluntary control of phase correction following event onset shifts in sensorimotor synchronization

Seven experiments show that an event onset shift (EOS) in an auditory sequence causes an involuntary phase correction response (PCR) in synchronized finger tapping. This PCR is (a) equally large in inphase and antiphase tapping; (b) reduced but still present when the EOS occurs in either of two interleaved (target-distractor) sequences; (c) unaffected by increased pitch separation between these sequences; (d) asymptotic in magnitude as EOS magnitude increases, unlike the intentional PCR to expected phase shifts; and (e) enhanced when the EOS precedes the onset of tapping, because of phase resetting. Thus, phase correction is revealed to be partially automatic and partially under voluntary control, and to be based mainly on temporal information derived from simple onset detection.     

Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing

On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

P300 amplitude variations,prior probabilities,and likelihoods: A Bayesian ERP study

The capability of the human brain for Bayesian inference was assessed by manipulating probabilistic contingencies in an urn-ball task. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded in response to stimuli that differed in their relative frequency of occurrence (.18 to .82). A veraged ERPs with sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (relative frequency of occurrence > .5) were used for further analysis. Research hypotheses about relationships between probabilistic contingencies and ERP amplitude variations were formalized as (in-)equality constrained hypotheses. Conducting Bayesian model comparisons, we found that manipulations of prior probabilities and likelihoods were associated with separately modifiable and distinct ERP responses. P3a amplitudes were sensitive to the degree of prior certainty such that higher prior probabilities were related to larger frontally distributed P3a waves. P3b amplitudes were sensitive to the degree of likelihood certainty such that lower likelihoods were associated with larger parietally distributed P3b waves. These ERP data suggest that these antecedents of Bayesian inference (prior probabilities and likelihoods) are coded by the human brain.     

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

This study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.     

Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning.