Brain-to-brain coupling: a mechanism for creating and sharing a social world

Cognition materializes in an interpersonal space. The emergence of complex behaviors requires the coordination of actions among individuals according to a shared set of rules. Despite the central role of other individuals in shaping one's mind, most cognitive studies focus on processes that occur within a single individual. We call for a shift from a single-brain to a multi-brain frame of reference. We argue that in many cases the neural processes in one brain are coupled to the neural processes in another brain via the transmission of a signal through the environment. Brain-to-brain coupling constrains and shapes the actions of each individual in a social network, leading to complex joint behaviors that could not have emerged in isolation.     

How tool use and arm position affect peripersonal space representation

Experiment 1 investigated whether tool use can expand the peripersonal space into the very far extrapersonal space. Healthy participants performed line bisection in peripersonal and extrapersonal space using wooden sticks up to a maximum of 240 cm. Participants misbisected to the left of the true midpoint, both for lines presented in peripersonal and for those presented in extrapersonal space, confirming a peripersonal space expansion up to a distance of 240 cm. Experiment 2 investigated whether arm position could influence the perception of peripersonal and extrapersonal space during tool use. Participants performed line bisection in the peripersonal and in the extrapersonal space (up to a maximum of 120 cm) using wooden sticks in two different conditions: either with the arm bent or with the arm stretched. Results showed stronger pseudoneglect in the stretched arm condition.     

On the Normativity of Intentions

Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ.