Verbal probabilities: a question of frame?

Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to convey the same probabilities (Experiments 1 and 2). Selection of phrase can be determined by linguistic frame. Positive quantifiers (‘some’, ‘several’) support positive probability phrases, whereas negative quantifiers (‘not all’) suggest negative phrases (Experiment 3). Positive frames induced by numeric frequencies (e.g. the number of students to be admitted) imply positive probability phrases, whereas negative frames (e.g. the number of students to be rejected) call for negative probability phrases (Experiment 4). It is concluded that choice of verbal phrase is based not only on level of probability, but also on situational and linguistic cues. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive components in risk perception: Natural versus manmade risks

In a questionnaire study 106 Norwegian students rated natural and manmade hazards according to risk magnitude and public versus private responsibility for risk management. Another group of 50 subjects judged 36 natural hazards on nine risk dimensions used in previous psychometric studies of ‘manmade risks’. When ratings on nine risk characteristics for natural hazards were factor analyzed a three-dimensional solution was found, with one active/passive dimension, one potency dimension, and one novelty dimension. This contrasts with the two-dimensional solution found for manmade hazards. Responsibility for risk management was found to be related to the type of risk in focus, and different risk characteristics seem to play different roles for manmade and natural hazards.     

Formalization and the Objects of Logic

There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put forward in the debate. The core of the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for presupposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utterances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information about linguistic structure and pragmatic context.     

The Norwegian version of the five factor narcissism inventory for vulnerable narcissism and the grandiose narcissism subscale of indifference: Psychometric properties of the long‐ and short‐form versions

In recent years, narcissism has been reconceptualized as a multi‐dimensional feature of human psychology. The Five Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI) has been proposed as a measure for two distinguishable dimensions of narcissism: Vulnerable and Grandiose (Glover, Miller, Lynam, Crego & Widiger, 2012). To investigate the role that some of these factors may have in moderating responses to cues of social exclusion, implemented in a connected laboratory experiment, we translated the subscales for Vulnerable Narcissism and the Grandiose Narcissism subscale of Indifference from English into Norwegian and included them in an online survey that was used to recruit and pre‐screen participants for the laboratory experiment. In this paper, we test the psychometric properties of these translated self‐report measures, in what amounted to be a diverse sample of the Norwegian population. We perform reliability tests and confirmatory factor analysis on the long‐ and short‐form versions of FFNI Vulnerable Narcissism and the Grandiose Narcissism subscale of Indifference. We further test the criterion validity of these measures by way of correlational analyses with other theoretically relevant measures. We conclude that the Norwegian short‐form versions of FFNI Vulnerable Narcissism and Grandiose Narcissism subscale of Indifference exhibit good psychometric properties in our data and propose that the translated scales can now be used to explore these constructs in clinical and non‐clinical populations in Norway, and can be easily adapted for use in other Scandinavian countries.     

Giving up on unattainable goals: benefits for health?

Three studies examined associations between goal disengagement and goal reengagement tendencies and indicators of physical health (e.g., health problems, cortisol rhythms, sleep efficiency). Based on research showing that goal adjustment tendencies are associated with subjective well-being, the authors predicted that people who are better able to disengage from unattainable goals and reengage with alternative goals also may experience better physical health. Across the three studies, the findings demonstrate that the ability to disengage from unattainable goals is associated with better self-reported health and more normative patterns of diurnal cortisol secretion. Goal reengagement, by contrast, was unrelated to indicators of physical health but buffered some of the adverse effects of difficulty with goal disengagement. The results also indicate that subjective well-being can mediate the associations between goal disengagement tendencies and physical health.     

Strict Naturalism and Christianity: Attempt at Drafting an Updated Theology of Nature

In the first part of this essay I sketch a view on cosmogenesis from the perspective of modern science, emphasizing, first, that the laws of nature are outcomes of the history of nature, not imposed on nature from outside of nature; and, second, that the universe, including human beings, is the result of a single, natural process. It consistently brings forth novelty through a probabilistic sequence of syntheses. Consequently, the new emerges from the unification of elements that were previously unified. This universal creative process is both probabilistic and nonlinear. It is probabilistic (historical) because each creative event occurs within a cohort of also possible events. It is nonlinear because the new has qualities that its elements in isolation do not possess. I refer to this model of understanding cosmogenesis as strict naturalism. In the second part of the essay I argue that deistic and theistic models of cosmogenesis cannot cope with strict naturalism because they exclude teleology and supernatural interference in the creative process. In contrast to deism and theism, I show that Christianity is capable of integrating strict naturalism. To do that I focus on the Christian notion of incarnation. At the center of this reflection is the attempt to increase the understanding of Christian faith that only the Word of God creates.