Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious

Dienes and Berry (1997) argue that there really are two kinds of knowledge, implicit and explicit, that can be characterized through a subjective threshold. We argue that the subjective threshold does not separate two forms of knowledge, but instead two uses of knowledge, for two different purposes. With Neal and Hesketh (1997), we suggest that an understanding of learning will be better served by investigating the processing that occurs under various circumstances than by attempting to isolate learning that occurs with awareness from that which occurs without it.     

Interaction of cognitive and sensorimotor maps of visual space

Studies of saccadic suppression and induced motion have suggested separate representations of visual space for perception and visually guided behavior. Because these methods required stimulus motion, subjects might have confounded motion and position. We separated cognitive and sensorimotor maps without motion of target, background, or eye, with an “induced Roelofs effect”: a target inside an off-center frame appears biased opposite the direction of the frame. A frame displayed to the left of a subject’s center line, for example, will make a target inside the frame appear farther to the right than its actual position. The effect always influences perception, but in half of our subjects it did not influence pointing. Cognitive and sensorimotor maps interacted when the motor response was delayed; all subjects now showed a Roelofs effect for pointing, suggesting that the motor system was being fed from the biased cognitive map. A second experiment showed similar results when subjects made an open-ended cognitive response instead of a five-alternative forced choice. Experiment 3 showed that the results were not due to shifts in subjects’ perception of the felt straight-ahead position. In Experiment 4, subjects pointed to the target and judged its location on the same trial. Both measures showed a Roelofs effect, indicating that each trial was treated as a single event and that the cognitive representation was accessed to localize this event in both response modes.     

Need probability affects retention: A direct demonstration

Recent memory theory has emphasized the concept ofneed probability—that is, the probability that a given piece of learned information will be tested at some point in the future. It has been proposed that, in real-world situations, need probability declines over time and that the memory-loss rate is calibrated to match the progressive reduction in need probability (J. R. Anderson & Schooler, 1991). The present experiments were designed to examine the influence of the slope of the need-probability curve on the slope of the retention curve. On each of several trials, subjects memorized a list of digits, then retained the digits in memory for 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 sec. Some trials ended with a recall test; other trials ended with the message, “no test.” In Experiment 1, the likelihood of encountering a memory test (i.e., the need probability) was made to either increase or decrease as the retention interval increased; in Experiment 2, need probability either was flat (invariant across retention intervals) or decreased as the retention interval increased. The results indicated that the shape of the need-probability curve influenced the slope of the retention curve (Experiment 1) and that the effect became larger as the experimental session progressed (Experiment 2). The findings support the notion that memory adapts to need probabilities and that the rate of forgetting is influenced by the slope of the need-probability curve. In addition, all of the forgetting curves approximated a power function, suggesting that need probability influences the slope but not the form of forgetting.     

The Unintended Negative Consequences of Sympathy for the Stigmatized1

Research on attitudes toward the stigmatized indicates that negative feelings and stereotypes toward the stigmatized are often mixed with positive feelings of sympathy and concern. Three studies investigate the hypothesis that positive outcomes for the stigmatized that are motivated by sympathy may have unintended negative consequences for self-esteem, affect, and motivation. Subjects were asked to imagine themselves in the position of a stigmatized person who received a job either because he or she was qualified, or out of sympathy for a stigmatizing condition. Results indicated that subjects reported lower state self-esteem, more negative affect, and lowered work motivation when the job was offered out of sympathy rather than on the basis of qualifications. Study 2 showed that the negative effects of sympathy occur whether the basis for the sympathy is prejudice and discrimination or mobility problems faced by the stigmatized individual. The third experiment showed that sympathy has negative effects when the sympathy is based either on individual or group-based problems imposed by the stigmatizing condition. The findings are discussed in terms of the attributional ambiguity surrounding positive outcomes faced by the stigmatized and applied to the effects of affirmative-action programs.     

Assessing the stability of principal components using regression

This paper presents an analysis, based on simulation, of the stability of principal components. Stability is measured by the expectation of the absolute inner product of the sample principal component with the corresponding population component. A multiple regression model to predict stability is devised, calibrated, and tested using simulated Normal data. Results show that the model can provide useful predictions of individual principal component stability when working with correlation matrices. Further, the predictive validity of the model is tested against data simulated from three non-Normal distributions. The model predicted very well even when the data departed from normality, thus giving robustness to the proposed measure. Used in conjunction with other existing rules this measure will help the user in determining interpretability of principal components.The authors would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers and the two editors for their valuable comments. Atanu R. Sinha gratefully acknowledges the research support received from the Marketing Studies Center, AGSM, UCLA. Send requests for reprints to Atanu R. Sinha, B418 Gold Hall, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095.     

Reply to Chrzan’s comments

1 This paper discusses the following works: Alvin Plantinga,The Nature of Necessity, Oxford University Press 1974, Chapter 9 Section 11; Keith Chrzan, ‘Plantinga on Atheistic Induction,’Sophia Vol 27 No. 2 (July 1988), 10–14; Bruce Langtry, ‘God, Evil and Probability,’,Sophia Vol 28 No. 1 (April 1989), 32–40; and Keith Chrzan, ‘Comment on Langtry's “God, Evil and Probability”,’Sophia Vol 32 No. 2 (July 1993), 54–58. The numbering of propositions throughout is the same as in my earlier paper. All page references to Chrzan are to his second paper.     

Public knowledge,attitudes, and beliefs about homeless people: Evidence for compassion fatigue?

Media reports suggest that the public is becoming impatient with the homeless—that so-called “compassion fatigue” has gripped the nation. This characterization of public sentiment could have important policy consequences—restrictive measures can be justified by growing public impatience, and progressive housing policies seem infeasible within a hostile climate of opinion. But evidence to support the compassion fatigue notion is anecdotal. We examine the issue by tracking the results of public opinion polls and by reporting detailed evidence from a nationwide random-digit dial telephone survey (N=1,507) concerning knowledge attitudes and beliefs about homeless people. To be sure, the public sees homelessness as an undesirable social problem and wants something done about it. However, although the homeless are clearly stigmatized, there is little evidence to suggest that the public has lost compassion and is unwilling to support policies to help homeless people.     

Piaget and Vygotsky Revisited: Dialogue or Assimilation?

In response to suggestions for merging Piagetian and Vygotskian psychology on the basis of their apparent similarity (e.g., Glassman, 1994), it is argued that numerous differences between the two paradigms constitute fundamental principled disagreements, and that these ought not to be minimized or simplified. Some fundamental differences involve underlying philosophy, social influences on development, the nature of the developmental process itself, developmental stages, and universality of cognitive structures. It is argued that a project of combining Piagetian and Vygotskian psychology would be premature at best, and that continued dialogue between these two distinct perspectives would be of greater value.