Simplest tasks have greatest dual task interference with balance in brain injured adults

Attention difficulties and poor balance are both common sequel following a brain injury. This study aimed to determine whether brain injured adults had greater difficulty than controls in performing a basic balance task while concurrently completing several different cognitive tasks varying in visuo-spatial attentional load and complexity. Twenty brain injured adults and 20 age-, sex- and education level-matched controls performed a balance-only task (step stance held for 30 s), five cognitive-only tasks (simple and complex non-spatial, visuo-spatial, and a control articulation task), and both together (dual tasks). Brain injured adults showed a greater centre of pressure (COP) excursion and velocity in all conditions than controls. Brain injured adults also demonstrated greater interference with balance when concurrently performing two cognitive tasks than control subjects. These were the control articulation and the simple non-spatial task. It is likely that distractibility during these simple tasks contributed to an increase in COP motion and interference with postural stability in stance. Performing visuo-spatial tasks concurrently with the balance task did not result in any change in COP motion. Dual task interference in this group is thus unlikely to be due to structural interference. Similarly, as the more complex tasks did not uniformly result in increased interference, a reduction in attentional capacity in the brain injured population is unlikely to be the primary cause of dual task interference in this group.     

Normative Requirements

Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing normative requirements with reasons.