The logic of the stimulus

This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes–its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

Perception of health risks: How smoker status affects defensive optimism

Abstract

People generally underestimate their risk to come down with a life-threatening disease when comparing themselves to similar others. However, to some extent they do take objective risk status or actual risk behavior into account. The present study examined specific conditions of this phenomenon. It was found that smoker status was associated with a somewhat higher perceived risk of getting lung cancer or smoker's cough or having a heart attack, but not of coming down with other diseases. Still, smokers did not admit that they had an above-average risk for these maladies, thus reflecting defensive optimism. In addition, smokers characterized the behavior of an abstract person, a “risk stereotype”, by estimating the number of years of smoking, the daily number of cigarettes, and the cigarettes' nicotine content necessary to be at high risk for lung cancer. There was evidence that smokers used these risk stereotypes as a reference point for evaluating their own relative risk. Smokers also made higher risk estimates if their own behavior approached that of the risk stereotype. On the whole, the results suggest that people use subjective risk factor theories when estimating their own personal health risks.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

Perceiving college peers’ alcohol consumption: temporal patterns and individual differences in overestimation

Objective: This study examines temporal patterns and individual differences of overestimation in alcohol norm perception within a social network.

Design: Hundred psychology freshmen indicated biweekly during their first semester the drinks they consumed, the perceived average of their peers’ consumption, and with whom they were acquainted. At baseline, trait self-control was assessed.

Main outcome: The moderation of alcohol consumption overestimation by time and individual characteristics was explored.

Results: Results show that students overestimated alcohol consumption of their acquainted peers by 1.22 drinks (p?<?.001). For time periods at which peers reported high consumption, overestimation decreased. Additionally, individuals reporting high alcohol consumption (b?=??0.25, p?<?.001) and low self-control (b?=?0.27, p?=?.010) showed higher overestimation.

Conclusions: Students overestimate the alcohol consumption of peers not fully accounting for changes in peer-reports. Furthermore, individual differences suggest informational and motivational processes underlying overestimation.