The Effect of Induced Mood on Children’s Social Information Processing: Goal Clarification and Response Decision

We investigated whether induced mood influenced the social information processing steps of goal clarification and response decision in 480 1st–3rd graders, and in more selected groups of low accepted-aggressive (n = 39), average accepted-nonaggressive (n = 103), and high accepted-nonaggressive children (n = 68). Children participated in two sessions; in the first session peer assessments were administered. In the second session children were randomly assigned to receive either a happy, angry, or neutral mood induction prior to participating in a social cognitive interview assessing goals, outcome expectancies, and self efficacy for competent, hostile, and passive responses in the context of ambiguous provocations. Results revealed that an angry mood increased focus on instrumental goals. Low accepted-aggressive children were more susceptible to the effects of mood than were high accepted- and average-nonaggressive children. In addition, children’s predominant goal orientation was related to children’s response decisions; children with predominantly instrumental goals evaluated nonhostile responses to provocation more negatively and had higher self efficacy for hostile responses. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

Making sense of abstract events: Building event schemas

Everyday events, such as making a bed, can be segmented hierarchically, with the coarse level characterized by changes in the actor’s goals and the fine level by subgoals (Zacks, Tversky, &; Iyer, 2001). Does hierarchical event perception depend on knowledge of actors’ intentions? This question was addressed by asking participants to segment films of abstract, schematic events. Films were novel or familiarized, viewed forward or backward, and simultaneously described or not. The participants interpreted familiar films as more intentional than novel films and forward films as more intentional than backward films. Regardless of experience and film direction, however, the participants identified similar event boundaries and organized them hierarchically. An analysis of the movements in each frame revealed that event segments corresponded to bursts of change in movement features, with greater bursts for coarse than for fine units. Perceiving event structure appears to enable event schemas, rather than resulting from them.     

Hierarchical encoding of behavior: translating perception into action

People encode goal-directed behaviors, such as assembling an object, by segmenting them into discrete actions, organized as goal-subgoal hierarchies. Does hierarchical encoding contribute to observational learning? Participants in 3 experiments segmented an object assembly task into coarse and fine units of action and later performed it themselves. Hierarchical encoding, measured by segmentation patterns, correlated with more accurate and more hierarchically structured performance of the later assembly task. Furthermore, hierarchical encoding increased when participants (a) segmented coarse units first, (b) explicitly looked for hierarchical structure, and (c) described actions while segmenting them. Improving hierarchical encoding always led to improvements in learning, as well as a surprising shift toward encoding and executing actions from the actor's spatial perspective instead of the participants' own. Hierarchical encoding facilitates observational learning by organizing perceived actions into a representation that can serve as an action plan.     

Just because you're imaging the brain doesn't mean you can stop using your head: a primer and set of first principles

Developments within the neurosciences, cognitive sciences, and social sciences have contributed to the emergence of social neuroscience. Among the most obvious contemporary developments are brain-imaging procedures such as functional magnetic resonance imaging. The authors outline a set of first principles designed to help make sense of brain-imaging research within the fields of cognitive and social neuroscience. They begin with a principle few would debate--that social cognition, emotion, and behavior involve the brain--but whose implications might not be entirely obvious to those new to the field. The authors conclude that (a). complex aspects of the mind and behavior will benefit from yet a broader collaboration of neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and social scientists, and (b). social psychologists bring important theoretical, methodological, and statistical expertise to this interdisciplinary enterprise.