Mindfulness,Self-Esteem,and Unconditional Self-Acceptance

Ellis (Ellis, A. (1996), Psychotherapy, 22(1), 149–151) has been a longstanding critic of the concept of self-esteem and has offered the notion of unconditional self-acceptance as an alternative. Other researchers have suggested that cultivating mindfulness––attention directed towards one’s immediate experiences with an attitude of non-judgment––also offers a healthier alternative to self-esteem (Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K. W. (2003) Psychological Inquiry, 14(1), 71–76). This study examined the relationship between mindfulness, self-esteem, and unconditional self-acceptance. A sample of 167 university students completed two measures of everyday mindfulness, and measures of self-esteem and unconditional self-acceptance. Positive correlations were found between mindfulness, self-esteem, and unconditional self-acceptance. Mindfulness skills may offer a means to cultivate unconditional self-acceptance and to shift from an emphasis on self-esteem as a measure of worth. This paper was based on data collected for the first author's Master's project.     

Guided saccades modulate face- and body-sensitive activation in the occipitotemporal cortex during social perception

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has identified distinct brain regions in ventral occipitotemporal cortex (VOTC) and lateral occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC) that are differentially activated by pictures of faces and bodies. Recent work from our laboratory has shown that the strong LOTC activation evoked by bodies in which the face is occluded is attenuated when the occlusion is removed. We hypothesized that this attenuation may occur because subjects preferentially fixate upon faces when present in the scene. Here, we experimentally manipulated subjects’ fixations while they viewed a static picture of a character whose face, hand, and torso were continuously visible throughout each run. The subject’s saccades and fixations were guided by a small fixation cross that made discrete jumps to a new location every 500 ms. Subjects were instructed to follow the fixation cross and make a button press whenever it changed size. In a series of blocks, the fixation cross shifted from locations on the face, on the hand, and to locations on a background image of a phase-scrambled face. In a second study, the fixation cross moved similarly, but the hand locations were changed to locations along the character’s body or torso. A localizer task was used to identify face- and body-sensitive regions of LOTC. Body-sensitive regions were strongly activated when the subjects’ saccades were guided over the character’s torso relative to when the saccades were guided over the character’s face. Little to no activity occurred in the body-sensitive region of LOTC when the subjects’ saccades were guided over the character’s hand. The localizer task was unable to differentiate body-sensitive regions in lateral VOTC from face-sensitive regions, or body-sensitive regions in medial VOTC from flower-sensitive regions. Guided saccades over the body strongly activated both lateral and medial VOTC. These results provide new insights into the function of body-sensitive visual areas in both LOTC and VOTC, and illustrate the potential confounding influence of uncontrolled eye movements for neuroimaging studies of social perception.     

Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning

We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, suffices to produce efficiency in information transfer.     

Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.

In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and finally, offers an analysis of Rott’s recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [32], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.     

Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.     

Co-induction of long-term potentiation and long-term depression at a central synapse in the leech

Most studies of long-term potentiation (LTP) have focused on potentiation induced by the activation of postsynaptic NMDA receptors (NMDARs). However, it is now apparent that NMDAR-dependent signaling processes are not the only form of LTP operating in the brain [Malenka, R. C., & Bear, M. F. (2004). LTP and LTD: An embarrassment of riches. Neuron, 44, 5–21]. Previously, we have observed that LTP in leech central synapses made by the touch mechanosensory neurons onto the S interneuron was NMDAR-independent [Burrell, B. D., & Sahley, C. L. (2004). Multiple forms of long-term potentiation and long-term depression converge on a single interneuron in the leech CNS. Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 4011–4019]. Here we examine the cellular mechanisms mediating T-to-S (T → S) LTP and find that its induction requires activation of metabotropic glutamate receptors (mGluRs), voltage-dependent Ca²⁺ channels (VDCCs) and protein kinase C (PKC). Surprisingly, whenever LTP was pharmacologically inhibited, long-term depression (LTD) was observed at the tetanized synapse, indicating that LTP and LTD were activated at the same time in the same synaptic pathway. This co-induction of LTP and LTD likely plays an important role in activity-dependent regulation of synaptic transmission.     

Generalization of conditioned fear-potentiated startle in humans: experimental validation and clinical relevance

Though generalization of conditioned fear has been implicated as a central feature of pathological anxiety, surprisingly little is known about the psychobiology of this learning phenomenon in humans. Whereas animal work has frequently applied methods to examine generalization gradients to study the gradual weakening of the conditioned-fear response as the test stimulus increasingly differs from the conditioned stimulus (CS), to our knowledge no psychobiological studies of such gradients have been conducted in humans over the last 40 years. The current effort validates an updated generalization paradigm incorporating more recent methods for the objective measurement of anxiety (fear-potentiated startle). The paradigm employs 10, quasi-randomly presented, rings of gradually increasing size with extremes serving as CS+ and CS−. The eight rings of intermediary size serve as generalization stimuli (GSs) and create a continuum-of-similarity from CS+ to CS−. Both startle data and online self-report ratings demonstrate continuous decreases in generalization as the presented stimulus becomes less similar to the CS+. The current paradigm represents an updated and efficacious tool with which to study fear generalization—a central, yet understudied conditioning-correlate of pathologic anxiety.     

Drinking without thinking: an implicit measure of alcohol motivation predicts failure to control alcohol use

Addiction is characterized by dyscontrol - substance use despite intentions to restrain. Using a sample of at-risk drinkers, the present study examined whether an implicit measure of alcohol motivation (the Implicit Association Test [IAT]; Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480) would predict dyscontrol of alcohol use. Participants completed an IAT and, to elicit motivation to restrain alcohol use, were instructed that greater consumption in a taste test would impair performance on a later task for which they could win a prize. All participants viewed aversive slides and then completed a thought-listing task. Participants either exerted self-control by suppressing negative affect and thoughts regarding the slides or did not exert self-control. Post-manipulation, the groups did not differ in mood, urge to drink or motivation to restrain consumption. During the subsequent taste test, participants whose self-control resources were depleted consumed more alcohol than did those in the control group. Additionally, the IAT, but not an explicit measure of alcohol motivation, more strongly predicted alcohol use when self-control resources were depleted. The results indicate that the IAT may have utility in predicting dyscontrolled alcohol use.     

Attentional resources in visual tracking through occlusion: the high-beams effect

A considerable amount of research has uncovered heuristics that the visual system employs to keep track of objects through periods of occlusion. Relatively little work, by comparison, has investigated the online resources that support this processing. We explored how attention is distributed when featurally identical objects become occluded during multiple object tracking. During tracking, observers had to detect small probes that appeared sporadically on targets, distracters, occluders, or empty space. Probe detection rates for these categories were taken as indexes of the distribution of attention throughout the display and revealed two novel effects. First, probe detection on an occluder’s surface was better when either a target or distractor was currently occluded in that location, compared to when no object was behind that occluder. Thus even occluded (and therefore invisible) objects recruit object-based attention. Second, and more surprising, probe detection for both targets and distractors was always better when they were occluded, compared to when they were visible. This new attentional high-beams effect indicates that the ability to track through occlusion, though seemingly effortless, in fact requires the active allocation of special attentional resources.     

A Puzzle for Particulars?

In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red₁—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red₁ is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.