Moral intuitionism and disagreement

According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed moral beliefs. However, it is implausible to think that commonplace disagreement seriously undermines moral knowledge, and thus it is implausible to think that the standard account of moral intuitionism is true.     

The locality and globality of instrumental rationality: the normative significance of preference reversals

When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all of one’s beliefs and desires. To address these challenges, I first develop a minimal notion of instrumental rationality that issues in localized, goal-relative demands of coherence. This minimal conception of instrumental rationality is then used to offer a more sophisticated account of the global aspects of instrumental rationality. The resulting view abandons all-or-nothing assessments of rationality and allows us to evaluate decision makers as being rational to varying degrees. My aim is to propose a theory that is both psychologically and normatively plausible.     

The ecology of spatial memory in four lemur species

Evolutionary theories suggest that ecology is a major factor shaping cognition in primates. However, there have been few systematic tests of spatial memory abilities involving multiple primate species. Here, we examine spatial memory skills in four strepsirrhine primates that vary in level of frugivory: ruffed lemurs (Varecia sp.), ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta), mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz), and Coquerel’s sifakas (Propithecus coquereli). We compare these species across three studies targeting different aspects of spatial memory: recall after a long-delay, learning mechanisms supporting memory and recall of multiple locations in a complex environment. We find that ruffed lemurs, the most frugivorous species, consistently showed more robust spatial memory than the other species across tasks—especially in comparison with sifakas, the most folivorous species. We discuss these results in terms of the importance of considering both ecological and social factors as complementary explanations for the evolution of primate cognitive skills.     

UTILIZATION OF VIDEO MODELING COMBINED WITH SELF‐MONITORING TO INCREASE RATES OF ON‐TASK BEHAVIOR

The study investigated the effectiveness of an intervention package consisting of self‐monitoring and video modeling to increase on‐task behavior during independent seatwork time in math. Four students in either the second or third grade, identified as displaying high rates of off‐task behavior by their classroom teacher, were included in the study. Results showed immediate, large, and durable changes in on‐task behavior for each of the four participants. At baseline, on‐task behavior of the participants while working on independent math assignments was displayed in 47% of the intervals observed. During the intervention, the participants' average rate of on‐task behavior increased to 85% of the intervals observed. Mean Busk and Serlin (1994) effect size for all four participants was 5.60, with a percentage of non‐overlapping data points effect size of 100%. Observations of the participants 3 weeks following the termination of the study showed that the gains in on‐task behavior were maintained. Both teacher and participant feedbacks concerning the use and effectiveness of the intervention package were positive. Results of the investigation suggest that the intervention package may be an effective and socially valid method for addressing off‐task behaviors of students within the classroom. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining Adolescent Cocaine Use with Social Learning and Self-Control Theories

An estimated 1.6 million adolescents use cocaine on a regular basis. Social learning theory and self-control theory are regularly used to explain adolescent substance use, but few studies have examined Hirschi’s (2004) revised self-control theory. This study examines the efficacy of these three theories in explaining adolescent cocaine use using data from the 2011 Monitoring the Future survey. The study finds that Hirschi’s (2004) revised theory and peer hard drug use predicted the probability of adolescent cocaine use in the previous 30 days. When examining cocaine use in the prior year, all three theoretical perspectives were significant predictor of cocaine use. The implications of the findings are discussed.     

Kant and the Discipline of Reason

Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue that its goal is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue further that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique as commentators have tended to claim, the Discipline is, in fact, the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics.