An afterword: the utility of cognitive models for the field of psychopathology

Cognitive models of psychopathology provide opportunities and challenges for both the research psychopathologist and the clinician concerned with practical applications to individuals. Heterogeneity of individual pathology within diagnostic categories, heterogeneity of content within symptom categories, undue reliance on judgment-based ratings, and frequent emphasis on deficit rather than the overt behavior of the patients are some of the major issues. Others include the complex interaction between cognitive and affective processes and the fact that input-output functions are often nonlinear and marked by critical threshold values for the appearance of overt pathology. An important feature of models is the discipline that they introduce into theorizing about psychopathology plus the focus on precise quantification.     

Selective orienting of attention to masked threat faces in social anxiety

The aims of the study were two-fold: to examine whether previous evidence of a pre-attentive bias for masked threat faces in anxious individuals could be replicated, and to assess the relationship between the predicted bias and measures of trait and social anxiety. Pairs of face stimuli were briefly displayed and masked in a modified version of the visual probe task. Results indicated that high anxious individuals were faster to respond to probes occurring in the spatial location of masked threat rather than neutral faces; consistent with their attention being automatically captured by sub-threshold threat cues. Furthermore, this vigilance effect for masked threat faces appeared to be primarily a function of social anxiety and social avoidance, rather than trait anxiety. It was also more apparent when threat faces were presented in the left visual field, suggestive of right hemisphere involvement.     

Selective attention to angry faces in clinical social phobia

This study investigated the time course of attentional responses to emotional facial expressions in a clinical sample with social phobia. With a visual probe task, photographs of angry, happy, and neutral faces were presented at 2 exposure durations: 500 and 1250 ms. At 500 ms, the social phobia group showed enhanced vigilance for angry faces, relative to happy and neutral faces, in comparison with normal controls. In the 1250-ms condition, there were no significant attentional biases in the social phobia group. Results are consistent with a bias in initial orienting to threat cues in social anxiety. Findings are discussed in relation to recent cognitive models of anxiety disorders.     

A pilot randomised controlled trial of a home-based writing intervention for individuals with seizures

Objective: We investigated the feasibility, acceptability and preliminary effectiveness of a writing intervention for individuals with epilepsy or psychogenic nonepileptic seizures.

Methods: Individuals were randomised to write about potentially ‘therapeutic’ topics (n = 43) or about their daily events (n = 25). Participants were asked to write on four separate occasions for at least 20 min. Repeated-measures analysis of variance was used to investigate change in measures of health-related quality of life (NEWQoL-6D), depression (NDDI-E), anxiety (GAD-7) and illness perception (B-IPQ) from baseline to one and three-month follow-ups. Qualitative and quantitative data taken from a Writing Task Questionnaire was analysed between the two conditions.

Results: Recruitment was acceptable with 52% of those randomised completing the full writing intervention. In both conditions, participants wrote for longer than 20 min suggesting those who completed the study engaged well with the procedure. Greater benefits were observed in the ‘therapeutic’ condition (p < 0.05), which was associated with an improvement in health-related quality of life at one-month follow-up (p = 0.02). No differences were found in the other measures.

Conclusions: A writing intervention is acceptable in this population. Self-reported benefits were modest, suggesting therapeutic writing may be more suitable as a supplement to other therapies rather than a stand-alone therapeutic intervention.     

“Let the heavens be glad,and the earth rejoice”: religion and life satisfaction among emerging adults in the United States

Although previous research suggests that religion contributes to greater life satisfaction, there is still disagreement about what aspects of religion predict greater life satisfaction. Despite a growing body of theory and research on emerging adulthood as a life stage that is distinct from adolescence and young adulthood, there has also been limited research on the relationship between religion and life satisfaction among emerging adults. Based on the third wave of the National Study of Youth and Religion, our results suggest that two measures of private religiosity, private devotion and religious efficacy, are significantly related to greater life satisfaction among emerging adults. In contrast, other dimensions of private and public religiosity, such as participation in organised religion, religious salience, otherworldly beliefs, and number of religious friends, are not related to greater life satisfaction. Finally, among emerging adults, being spiritual but not religious is not significantly related to life satisfaction.     

The tale of a moderate normative skeptic

While Richard Joyce’s moral skepticism might seem to be an extreme metaethical view, it is actually far more moderate than it might first appear. By articulating four challenges facing his approach to moral skepticism, I argue that Joyce’s moderation is, in fact, a theoretical liability. First, the fact that Joyce is not skeptical about normativity in general makes it possible to develop close approximations to morality, lending support to moderate moral revisionism over moral error theory. Second, Joyce relies on strong, contentious conceptual and empirical claims in support of his views. Third, Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument threatens to backfire, generalizing to all normative judgments. Finally, Joyce fails to offer an adequate account of the normativity of desire. Each of these four challenges can be either sidestepped (the first and second) or embraced (the third and fourth) by radicalizing and defending a global form of normative skepticism. There are thus several ways in which global normative skepticism appears to be in a more robust dialectical position than Joyce’s moral skepticism. Furthermore, I argue, Joyce’s arguments against global normative skepticism are unconvincing. While this discussion is framed in terms of Joyce’s work, its arguments will apply to other moral skeptics who are not also global normative skeptics. The result is an invitation for Joyce and other moral skeptics to leave these problems behind and join the radical camp.