Factors impacting emergence of behavioral control by underselected stimuli in humans after reduction of control by overselected stimuli

Stimulus overselectivity occurs when only one of potentially many aspects of the environment controls behavior. Adult participants were trained and tested on a trial-and-error discrimination learning task while engaging in a concurrent load task, and overselectivity emerged. When responding to the overselected stimulus was reduced by reinforcing a novel stimulus in the presence of the previously overselected stimulus in a second trial-and-error discrimination task, behavioral control by the underselected stimulus became stronger. However, this result was only found under certain circumstances: when there was substantial overselectivity in the first training phase; when control by the underselected stimulus in the first phase was particularly low; and when there was effective reduction in the behavioral control exerted by the previously overselected stimuli. The emergence of behavioral control by the underselected stimulus suggests that overselectivity is not simply due to an attention deficit, because for the emergence to occur, the stimuli must have been attended to and learned about in the training phase; but that a range of additional learning factors may play a role.     

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.     

Differential‐associative processing: A new strategy for learning highly‐similar concepts

For many students concepts like fluid and crystallized intelligence are difficult to learn because they have highly‐similar definitions that are easy to confuse. The challenge of learning these highly‐similar, yet often confused concepts is further complicated by the fact that students are tested on exams about differences between the concepts. In this theoretically‐motivated research we test a new strategy for learning highly‐similar pairs of concepts, called differential‐associative processing. The results revealed that performance on multiple‐choice questions was higher when students learned highly‐similar concepts using differential‐associative processing rather than a strategy of their own choice, text‐based elaboration, or identifying similarities and differences. The results also revealed that students spontaneously transferred differential‐associative processing to a neutral control condition. Taken as a whole, the present study supports differential‐associative processing as a useful strategy for learning similar concepts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predictive validity of automatic self-associations for the onset of anxiety disorders

Negative self-cognitions are assumed to play an important role in the onset of anxiety disorders. Current dual-process models emphasize the relevance of differentiating between more automatic and more deliberate self-cognitions in this respect. Therefore, this study was designed to test the prognostic value of both deliberate and automatic self-anxious associations as a generic vulnerability factor for the onset of anxiety disorders between baseline and 2-year follow-up. To test the disorder specificity of negative self-associations, we also measured self-depressed associations. Self-report measures of depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, neuroticism, and fearful avoidance were included as covariates. Healthy controls (n=593), individuals who had depression (n=238), and individuals remitted from an anxiety disorder (n=448) were tested as part of the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety. Deliberate self-anxious associations predicted the onset of anxiety disorders in all groups. Automatic self-anxious associations showed predictive validity only in individuals remitted from an anxiety disorder or in currently depressed individuals. Although deliberate self-depressed associations were related to the onset of anxiety disorders as well, automatic self-depressed associations were not. In the (remitted) patient groups, only deliberate self-anxious associations showed independent predictive value for the onset of anxiety disorders together with self-reported fearful avoidance behavior. In the healthy controls, only a composite index of negative emotionality (depressive or anxiety symptoms and neuroticism) showed independent predictive validity. This study provides the first evidence that automatic and deliberate self-anxious associations have predictive value for the future onset of anxiety disorders.     

What is Good Reasoning?

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.     

Repetition priming of face recognition

Three experiments investigating the priming of the recognition of familiar faces are reported. In Experiment 1, recognizing the face of a celebrity in an “Is this face familiar?” task was primed by exposure several minutes earlier to a different photograph of the same person, but not by exposure to the person's written name (a partial replication of Bruce and Valentine, 1985). In Experiment 2, recognizing the face of a personal acquaintance was again primed by recognizing a different photograph of their face, but not by recognizing the acquaintance from that person's body shape, clothes etc. Experiment 3 showed that maximum repetition priming is obtained from prior exposure to an identical photograph of a famous face, less from a similar photograph, and least (but still significant) from a dissimilar photograph.

We argue that repetition priming is a function of the degree of physical similarity between two stimuli and that lack of priming between different stimulus types (e.g., written names and faces, or bodies and faces) may be attributable to lack of physical similarity between prime and test stimuli. Repetition priming effects may be best explained by some form of “instance-based” model such as that proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1985).     

Personality, Social Networks, and Perceived Social Support among Alcoholics: A Structural Equation Analysis

ABSTRACT In this study we tested relations among personality characteristics, social network properties, and perceived social support both concurrently and prospectively. A sample of 294 men in treatment at a Department of Veterans Affairs Alcohol Treatment Unit was assessed during treatment and 3 months after discharge. Results of the cross-sectional structural equation analyses indicated that the personality characteristics of extraversion and neu-roticism were related to both social network properties and perceived social support. Characteristics of the alcoholic's social network were also related to perceived availability of support. Longitudinal analyses of perceived social support after treatment indicated that two social network properties (size of the network and the proportion of confidants) were predictive net of initial levels of social support. Extraversion and neuroticism were found to be indi-rectly related to perceived social support at Time 2 through their effects on social network properties and perceived social support during treatment. Implications of these findings for models of the nature and determinants of perceived social support are discussed.     

The Absence of Practice Effects on a Forced-Choice Temporal Order Judgment Task

The encoding of temporal order information improves with practice (Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sanft, & Rose, 1984), but this improvement may be a result of task performance factors and may have little or nothing to do with encoding phenomena. In the present study, a forced-choice recency discrimination procedure was used to obviate the use of retrieval/performance strategies on the temporal order test. No improvement in temporal order judgments was observed.