A Person-Centred Perspective on Social Support in the Workplace

This research seeks to identify employees’ profiles characterised by distinct perceptions of three sources of social support at work (i.e., organisation, supervisor, and colleagues), and the extent to which these profiles generalise across two samples of workers (N = 185 and 387). This research also investigates the associations between the profiles and a series of outcomes. Latent profile analysis revealed five identical profiles in both samples: (1) moderately supported; (2) isolated; (3) supervisor supported; (4) weakly supported; and (5) highly supported. The most desirable outcomes (job satisfaction, performance, and affective commitment) were associated with Profile 5 (highly supported), while the highest levels of emotional exhaustion were observed in Profile 2 (isolated).     

Respiratory feedback in the generation of emotion

This article reports two studies investigating the relationship between emotional feelings and respiration. In the first study, participants were asked to produce an emotion of either joy, anger, fear or sadness and to describe the breathing pattern that fit best with the generated emotion. Results revealed that breathing patterns reported during voluntary production of emotion were (a) comparable to those objectively recorded in psychophysiological experiments on emotion arousal, (b) consistently similar across individuals, and (c) clearly differentiated among joy, anger, fear, and sadness. A second study used breathing instructions based on Study 1's results to investigate the impact of the manipulation of respiration on emotional feeling state. A cover story was used so that participants could not guess the actual purpose of the study. This manipulation produced significant emotional feeling states that were differentiated according to the type of breathing pattern. The implications of these findings for emotion theories based on peripheral feedback and for emotion regulation are discussed.     

What lies beneath: Reframing framing effects

Decision framing concerns how individuals build internal representations of problems and how these determine the choices that they make. Research in this area has been dominated by studies of the framing effect, showing reversals in preference associated with the form in which a decision problem is presented. While there are studies that fail to reveal this effect, there is at present no theory that can explain why and when the effect occurs. The purpose of this article is to present a selective review of research and use this to argue for a new framework for considering decision framing, to interpret past studies, and to set an agenda for future research. A simple information-processing model is developed. The model provides the basis for arguing that previous research has taken too narrow a view of how decision problems are internally represented and how these representations are transformed into choice behaviour. In addition, the model is used to highlight the importance of decision content and context.     

Conscious and unconscious reward cues can affect a critical component of executive control

The present study investigates whether updating an important function of executive control can be driven by unconscious reward cues. Participants had to memorize several numbers and update those numbers independently according to a sequence of arithmetic operations. At the beginning of each trial, a reward (1 euro or 5 cents) was presented, either subliminally or supraliminally. Participants could earn the reward if they found the correct response on the updating task. Results showed better performance when a high (conscious or unconscious) reward was at stake compared to a low reward. This suggests that subliminal information can influence a component process of executive control traditionally thought to require consciousness.     

How Accurate are Recruiters' First Impressions of Applicants in Employment Interviews?

The ability of recruiters and laypersons (students) to detect applicant personality traits and deception was studied. Participants viewed mock videotapes of target applicants answering interview questions. They subsequently judged the applicants' personality on the Big Five dimensions. Then, they viewed another videotape with other applicants presenting themselves either truthfully or not, and subsequently guessed which version was truthful. Personality judgments were compared with targets' self‐assessments and peer assessments to create an accuracy score. Both recruiters and students accurately detected applicants' global personality profile. Recruiters were better at this than students. However, students were better at judging the specific traits of openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness, whereas recruiters only accurately detected openness. Recruiters detected lies above chance whereas students did not.     

Relevance-driven information search in "pseudodiagnostic" reasoning

When faced with two competing hypotheses, people sometimes prefer to look at multiple sources of information in support of one hypothesis rather than to establish the diagnostic value of a single piece of information for the two hypotheses. This is termed pseudodiagnostic reasoning and has often been understood to reflect, among other things, poor information search strategies. Past research suggests that diagnostic reasoning may be more easily fostered when participants seek data to help in the selection of one of two competing courses of action as opposed to situations where they seek data to help infer which of two competing hypotheses is true. In the experiment reported here, we provide the first empirical evidence demonstrating that manipulating the relevance of the feature for which participants initially receive information determines whether they will make a nominally diagnostic or pseudodiagnostic selection. The discussion of these findings focuses on implications for the ability to engage in diagnostic hypothesis testing.     

Influence of suggestion in the DRM paradigm: what state of consciousness is associated with false memory?

We assessed the effect of suggestion on the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm and associated it with the Remember–Know–Guess paradigm. Undergraduate students were given either lists of semantically related words or texts containing these words. After the recall task, if participants did not produce the critical lure, the experimenter suggested that the word had been present, using either a question (moderate suggestion) or an assertion (strong suggestion); these conditions were compared to a condition without suggestion. Afterwards, participants took a recognition test. The results showed that strong suggestions lead to more false recognitions than other conditions and the state of consciousness associated with false recognitions tends to be a feeling of knowing rather than remembering, regardless of the verbal version (list or text). Therefore moderate suggestions did not lead to more false recognitions compare to no suggestion. We discuss the impact of suggestion on consciousness associated with false memories.     

Interdependent sampling and social influence

Most explanations of social influence focus on why individuals might want to agree with the opinions or attitudes of others. The authors propose a different explanation that assumes the attitudes of others influence only the activities and objects individuals are exposed to. For example, individuals are likely to be exposed to activities that their friends enjoy. The authors demonstrate that such influence over sampling behavior is sufficient to produce a social influence effect when individuals form attitudes by learning from experience. Even if the experiences of 2 individuals, when they sample an object or event, are independent random variables, their attitudes will become positively correlated if their sampling processes are interdependent. Interdependent sampling of activities thus provides a different explanation of social influence with distinct empirical and theoretical implications.     

Tactful or doubtful? Expectations of politeness explain the severity bias in the interpretation of probability phrases

When a statement about the occurrence of a medical condition is qualified by an expression of probability, such as the word possible, listeners interpret the probability of the condition as being higher the more severe the condition. This severity bias can have serious consequences for the well-being of patients. We argue that the bias is due to a misconception of the pragmatic function served by the expression of probability. The more severe the condition, the greater the chance that the listener construes the expression as a politeness marker rather than as an uncertainty marker. When this misconception does not occur, neither should the severity bias. An analysis of interpretations of probability expressions using a membership-function approach validates this account. We discuss the consequences of this bias for the communication of risk within and outside the medical domain.