Specific and differential prediction of health anxiety by disgust sensitivity and propensity

Current models of health anxiety suggest that fear resulting from false alarms to perceived threats to one's health results in the development of hypochondriasis and related disorders. Disgust has been proposed as an affective response that may function as an etiological and maintenance mechanism in health anxiety. Moreover, the way in which an individual perceives the disgust response (disgust sensitivity) may affect health anxiety, separately from their likelihood of experiencing disgust (disgust propensity). The present study utilized multiple hierarchical regression analysis to investigate the degree to which self-reported disgust sensitivity and disgust propensity differentially predict elevated health anxiety in a sample of 620 non-treatment-seeking undergraduates. Further, this effect is tested in comparison to that of anxiety sensitivity, a construct demonstrated to be strongly related to health anxiety. Analyses indicate that disgust sensitivity, rather than disgust propensity, is primarily responsible for this relation. An additional analysis tested the specificity of disgust sensitivity relative to anxiety sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity was no longer significant after including anxiety sensitivity in the model. Suggestions for further evaluation of this relation are provided. These results suggest that although disgust sensitivity may appear related to health anxiety, this relation may be confounded by anxiety sensitivity.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Terms of the debate on the format and structure of visual memory

Our ability to actively maintain information in visual memory is strikingly limited. There is considerable debate about why this is so. As with many questions in psychology, the debate is framed dichotomously: Is visual working memory limited because it is supported by only a small handful of discrete “slots” into which visual representations are placed, or is it because there is an insufficient supply of a “resource” that is flexibly shared among visual representations? Here, we argue that this dichotomous framing obscures a set of at least eight underlying questions. Separately considering each question reveals a rich hypothesis space that will be useful for building a comprehensive model of visual working memory. The questions regard (1) an upper limit on the number of represented items, (2) the quantization of the memory commodity, (3) the relationship between how many items are stored and how well they are stored, (4) whether the number of stored items completely determines the fidelity of a representation (vs. fidelity being stochastic or variable), (5) the flexibility with which the memory commodity can be assigned or reassigned to items, (6) the format of the memory representation, (7) how working memories are formed, and (8) how memory representations are used to make responses in behavioral tasks. We reframe the debate in terms of these eight underlying questions, placing slot and resource models as poles in a more expansive theoretical space.     

Labour-Based Justifications of Intellectual Property and the Problem of Disruptive Innovations

Justifying intellectual property on the basis of labour is an understandably popular strategy, but there is a tension in basing some intellectual property claims on labour that has gone largely unnoticed in treatments of the subject: many forms of innovation cause people to lose their jobs, which seriously hampers the ability of those who lose work to productively use their own labour. This article shows that even under Lockean and other labour-based justifications of intellectual property rights those who claim property rights to innovations of this type have special obligations to compensate those who lose work because of their inventions. By examining the problem that such innovations create, I hope to contribute to larger debates about automation and the job losses it often brings. Lockean and other labour-based theories of intellectual property are generally taken to secure strong, noninstrumental rights to intellectual property if they are successful. So, if even these theories imply that those who profit from the innovations driving automation have special obligations to those left jobless by it, that is strong evidence that they do in fact have such obligations.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.