Coarse threat images reveal theta oscillations in the amygdala: A magnetoencephalography study

Neurocognitive models propose a specialized neural system for processing threat-related information, in which the amygdala plays a key role in the analysis of threat cues. fMRI research indicates that the amygdala is sensitive to coarse visual threat relevant information—for example, low spatial frequency (LSF) fearful faces. However, fMRI cannot determine the temporal or spectral characteristics of neural responses. Consequently, we used magnetoencephalography to explore spatiotemporal patterns of activity in the amygdala and cortical regions with blurry (LSF) and normal angry, fearful, and neutral faces. Results demonstrated differences in amygdala activity between LSF threat-related and LSF neutral faces (50–250 msec after face onset). These differences were evident in the theta range (4–8 Hz) and were accompanied by power changes within visual and frontal regions. Our results support the view that the amygdala is involved in the early processing of coarse threat related information and that theta is important in integrating activity within emotion-processing networks.     

Effects of anxiety and attention control on processing pictorial and linguistic emotional information

This study investigated the role of executive attention control in modulating selective processing of emotional information in anxiety. It was hypothesized that the combination of high anxiety and poor attention control would be associated with greater difficulty in ignoring task-irrelevant threat-related information. The study included both faces and words as stimuli. Cognitive interference effects were assessed using two emotional Stroop tasks: one with angry, fearful, happy and neutral faces, and one with threat-related, positive, and neutral words. An objective measure of attention control was obtained from the Attention network task. There were four participant groups with high/low trait anxiety and high/low attention control. Results indicated that the combination of high anxiety and poor attention control was associated with greater cognitive interference by emotional faces (including angry faces), compared to neutral faces. This interference effect was not evident in participants with high anxiety and high attentional control, or in low-anxious individuals. There was no evidence of associations between anxiety, attention control, and the interference effect of emotional words. Results indicate that high anxiety and poor attention control together predict enhanced processing of emotionally salient information, such as angry facial expressions. Implications for models of emotion processing are discussed.     

Use of an analogue method to examine children’s appraisals of threat and emotion in response to stressful events

An analogue methodology was used to present a set of realistic, salient stressors to children in grades 3, 5, and 7. Children (N = 146) viewed eight videotaped vignettes depicting interpersonal and non-interpersonal stressors; these were expected to differentially threaten psychological needs for relatedness, competence and autonomy and provoke different emotional reactions. Analyses showed that scenarios portrayed stressors that were commonly experienced by children and evoked a differentiated profile of appraisals and emotions. When tenets of the motivational theory of stress and coping were tested, scenarios more threatening to needs were more distressing, sadness was linked to relatedness and competence threat appraisals, and fear was a more common reaction to parent stressors that involved dyadic conflict. After accounting for threat appraisals and previous experience of stressors, younger children and girls appraised events as more distressing than older children and boys. Future research could use the analogue procedure to focus on children’s development of regulation and coping with stress.     

Illusory control as a function of the motivation to avoid randomly determined aversive outcomes

Previous research has provided evidence that the need to attain appetitive outcomes positively affects the certainty of winning that outcome in purely chance-based games. Three experiments were conducted to test the notion that the need to avoid an aversive outcome affects winning confidence in the same fashion. In Experiment 1, participants were given the opportunity to avoid having to give an introductory remark (low need) or an impromptu speech (high need) to a group of peers by winning a chance-based card-drawing game. As predicted, confidence-in-winning ratings were found to be a positive function of outcome need. In Experiment 2, participants faced a similar card-drawing procedure but this time could avoid ostensibly having their arms submersed in either room temperature water (low need) or cold water (high need) need. Again as expected, results showed that participants in the high need condition not only displayed greater winning confidence but also believed more skill was involved in playing the purely chance-based game. In Experiment 3, the methodology of Experiment 1 was replicated incorporating a skill measure. The results of this experiment mirrored those of Experiment 2. Results of these investigations are discussed in terms of control theory.

The Big-5 ± 2? The impact of cognitive complexity on the factor structure of the five-factor model

Despite the popularity and prevalence of the five-factor model (FFM) of personality, numerous questions regarding its psychometric properties have yet to be investigated. One issue of particular concern is the underlying premise that these five personality factors are universally shared by all individuals. The present study examined the impact of cognitive complexity on the FFM by directly assessing whether individuals with higher or lower levels of cognitive complexity have personalities comprised of a greater or lesser number of factors, respectively, than the five widely accepted factors outlined by the FFM. Results indicated that individuals with lower levels of cognitive complexity have personalities best described by a three-factor model, whereas individuals with higher levels of cognitive complexity have personalities best described by a seven-factor model. In light of these findings, the appropriateness of universally applying the FFM to individuals of differing levels of cognitive complexity is discussed.     

Sex Differences in Referral Rates of Children with Gender Identity Disorder: Some Hypotheses

From 1978 through 1995, a sex ratio of 6.6:1 of boys to girls (N = 275) was observed for children referred to a specialty clinic for gender identity disorder. This article attempts to evaluate several hypotheses regarding the marked sex disparity in referral rates. The sexes did not differ on four demographic variables (age at referral, IQ, and parent's social class and marital status) and on five indices of general behavior problems on the Child Behavior Checklist; in addition, there was only equivocal evidence that boys with gender identity disorder had significantly poorer peer relations than girls with gender identity disorder. Although the percentage of boys and girls who met the complete DSM-III-R criteria for gender identity disorder was comparable, other measures of sex-typed behavior showed that the girls had more extreme cross-gender behavior than the boys. Coupled with external evidence that cross-gender behavior is less tolerated in boys than in girls by both peers and adults, it is concluded that social factors partly account for the sex difference in referral rates. Girls appear to require a higher threshold than boys for cross-gender behavior before they are referred for clinical assessment.     

How accurate are time-use reports? Effects of cognitive enhancement and cultural differences on recall accuracy

In order to assess the accuracy of time-use reports, 80 young adults were observed for 2-hour periods, and were interviewed about their activities by a different person the following day. Two experiments were performed. In the first, three different levels of cognitive enhancement were used to improve recall accuracy. Subjects were 60 California college students, 20 per group. In the second study the maximum enhancement condition was replicated with 20 Guatemalan subjects, similar in age, sex and level of education to the California subjects. Both the accuracy of their recall of specific activities, and the accuracy of their time-duration estimates were calculated. Results indicated that the enhancement conditions in Study 1 significantly increased both the number of activities recalled accurately (from 40 to 63 per cent) and the amount of time accurately recalled (from 58 to 70 per cent). In Study 2 the Guatemalans recalled 60 per cent of their activities accurately, and recalled as much time accurately as the Californians. The Guatemalans were significantly more likely to underestimate their time. In other words, when they made errors, these were almost always underestimations. Most of the recall error could be accounted for by forgetting an activity altogether, rather than by estimating its time inaccurately.     

POSITIVE PRACTICE OVERCORRECTION: THE EFFECTS OF DURATION OF POSITIVE PRACTICE ON ACQUISITION AND RESPONSE REDUCTION

The effects of long and short durations of positive practice overcorrection were studied, for reduction of off-task behavior after an instruction to perform an object-placement task. Off-task behavior, correct responses, and approximate responses were all observed. Off-task behavior received positive practice. The short and long practice durations (30 seconds and 3 minutes) produced equally rapid reduction of off-task behavior and acquisition of correct object-placement performance. Over sessions, much less time was required for positive practice when the short practice duration was used. Approximate responses, which also avoided positive practice, occurred at low rates relative to correct responding. Negative side effects were observed to occur primarily during sessions with long positive practice. These results indicate that use of short durations of positive practice can reduce the practice time required and negative side effects, with no loss of training effectiveness either for reducing inappropriate behavior or increasing a desired alternative behavior.