Perceiving causality after the fact: postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception

In simple dynamic events we can easily perceive not only motion, but also higher-level properties such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another. Several researchers have suggested that such causal perception is an automatic and stimulus-driven process, sensitive only to particular sorts of visual information, and a major research project has been to uncover the nature of these visual cues. Here, rather than investigating what information affects causal perception, we instead explore the temporal dynamics of when certain types of information are used. Surprisingly, we find that certain visual events can determine whether we perceive a collision in an ambiguous situation even when those events occur after the moment of potential 'impact' in the putative collision has already passed. This illustrates a type of postdictive perception: our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information presented within short temporal windows, so that new information which is obtained can influence the immediate past in our conscious awareness. Such effects have been previously demonstrated for low-level motion phenomena, but the present results demonstrate that postdictive processes can influence higher-level event perception. These findings help to characterize not only the 'rules' of causal perception, but also the temporal dynamics of how and when those rules operate.     

Culture and judgment of causal relevance

The authors hypothesized that because the causal theories of East Asians were more holistic and complex than those of Americans, the amount of information considered before making a final attribution would be larger for East Asians than for Americans. This hypothesis was supported through 4 studies. When participants attempted to explain a deviant behavior (Study 1) or a prosocial behavior (Study 2), Korean participants took into consideration a greater amount of information than did either American or Asian American participants. Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 within each culture. Finally, Study 4 established a link between the present findings and past research on culture and attribution. Namely, Study 4 found that Koreans made more external attributions than Americans because Koreans considered more information than did Americans.     

Cultural psychology of surprise: holistic theories and recognition of contradiction

The authors tested the hypothesis that East Asians, because of their holistic reasoning, take contradiction and inconsistency for granted and consequently are less likely than Americans to experience surprise. Studies 1 and 2 showed that Korean participants displayed less surprise and greater hindsight bias than American participants did when a target's behavior contradicted their expectations. Studies 3 and 4 further demonstrated that even when contradiction was created in highly explicit ways, Korean participants experienced little surprise, whereas American participants reported substantial surprise. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues, including the psychology of conviction, cognitive dissonance, and the development of science.     

Did COVID-19 really change our well-being? It's up to meaning in life: Evidence from two longitudinal studies

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, copious studies have explored whether and how COVID-19 has changed individuals' well-being. However, research has revealed mixed and inconsistent findings on this topic, with some suggesting that the pandemic hampered well-being, and others showing non-significant or even opposite patterns. Yet, little is known about what psychological factors could explain such discrepancies. The present study aims to fill this gap by proposing meaning in life (MIL) as a key moderator of the changes in well-being following the pandemic. Two studies reported here (total N = 19,828), which took within-person longitudinal approaches comparing subjective well-being (SWB; hedonic well-being) and psychological well-being (PWB; eudaimonic well-being) before and during COVID-19 (Study 1: 2018, 2019 vs. 2020, 2021; Study 2: 2019 vs. 2021), provided empirical evidence supporting our theoretical claims. Specifically, we found significant moderative effects of MIL in both studies, such that individuals who held a higher MIL amidst COVID-19 experienced an increase in SWB as well as PWB. In stark contrast, the two indicators of well-being declined over time among those who possessed a lower MIL during the pandemic. Overall, our results suggest that MIL serves as one of the significant moderators of the changes in well-being following COVID-19, which may address the previous conflicting findings in this field.     

Safety first,but for whom? Shifts in risk perception for self and others following COVID-19 vaccination

Vaccines can affect the mind as well as the body. Research on the psychological impact of vaccines has largely focused on risk-related judgments and behaviors involving the recipient. Here, we extend this work to risk-related judgments of others. In a prospective cohort study involving three samples and two timepoints (N = 588 adults), we tested competing hypotheses about the effects of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine on perceived risks to the unvaccinated: (1) a self/other differentiation hypothesis (vaccination will lead to estimation of lower risk for the self but higher risk for others) versus (2) a self/other correspondence hypothesis (vaccination will lead to estimation of lower risk from contracting COVID-19 for both self and others). Results revealed risk estimates as well as preferences for COVID-related social policies more consistent with the former hypothesis. We discuss potential psychological mechanisms and implications of these findings.     

Cognitive,Behavioral, and Personality Correlates of HIV-Positive Persons' Unsafe Sexual Behavior1

This study examined sexually risky behaviors of HIV-positive men and women within the framework of social cognitive theory. Condom use was found to be associated with high self-efficacy, positive influeces from social models, and specific condom use expectancies. As risky sexual behavior may be the manifestation of a more general pattern of risk taking that emerges from personality dispositions such as impulsiveness or psychoticism, this possibility was explored with discriminant analyses. Self-reported impulsivity, substance abuse, promiscuity, and deception served as markers of the presumed disposition. While these variables did not reliably distinguish between consistent and inconsistent condom users, they did enhance significantly the classification of individuals who, during the past 6 months, had been sexually abstinent, monogamous, or nonmonogamous. Those who reported more sex partners scored higher on impulsivity, disclosed more involvement with illegal drugs, and showed greater willingness to mislead potential partners about their sexual history than monogamous or sexually abstinent persons with HIV.     

False Consensus and False Uniqueness in Estimating the Prevalence of Health-Protective Behaviors

The degree to which people perceive that their health-relevant behaviors are also performed by their peers may influence whether they continue these practices or are susceptible to change. The present paper examined estimates of social consensus for health-relevant behaviors. It was hypothesized that respondents would perceive their own behaviors to be relatively more common than do people not performing them, the so-called False Consensus Effect. However, in terms of the accuracy of consensus estimates, people who behave in undesirable ways will tend to overestimate the actual number of others who behave similarly. In contrast, people who behave in desirable ways will underestimate the actual number of people who behave like themselves (false uniqueness). A group of college-aged males were asked to report about their performance of a series of health-relevant behaviors and to estimate the frequency of each behavior among their peers. The findings strongly supported the first two hypotheses and provided some support for the third. One practical implication of the results is that persons with unhealthy practices may resist public health campaigns and other interventions by overestimating consensus for their own behaviors. Also, individuals who think their undesirable health behaviors are relatively common may believe that they involve few health risks for them. The research suggests the need for further research on social cognitions about health, illness, and health-protective behaviors.     

Planning a Stigmatized Nonvisible Illness Disclosure: Applying the Disclosure Decision-Making Model

This study applied the disclosure decision-making model (DD-MM) to explore how individuals plan to disclose nonvisible illness (Study 1), compared to planning to disclose personal information (Study 2). Study 1 showed that perceived stigma from the illness negatively predicted disclosure efficacy; closeness predicted anticipated response (i.e., provision of support) although it did not influence disclosure efficacy; disclosure efficacy led to reduced planning, with planning leading to scheduling. Study 2 demonstrated that when information was considered to be intimate, it negatively influenced disclosure efficacy. Unlike the model with stigma (Study 1), closeness positively predicted both anticipated response and disclosure efficacy. The rest of the hypothesized relationships showed a similar pattern to Study 1: disclosure efficacy reduced planning, which then positively influenced scheduling. Implications of understanding stages of planning for stigmatized information are discussed.     

Ockham’s weak externalism

There is debate over whether the content of an intuitive cognition is determined externally or internally in Ockham’s theory. According to the most common view, which I call the Strong Externalist Interpretation (SE), intuitive content is wholly determined externally. Opposed to SE is the Strong Internalist Interpretation (SI), according to which the content of an intuition is wholly determined by internal features of a cognizer. The aim of this paper is to argue against those interpretations, and to argue for a third kind of interpretation which preserves interpretative advantages of SE and SI without falling into the difficulties that each faces. On this view, intuitive content is complex, and its complexity is analyzed into a mix of internalist and externalist elements.