Reinventing the celts

This paper, based largely upon fieldwork in Glastonbury, gives an overview of some of the beliefs and speculations about Celts and Druids which are now circulating in certain New Age circles. In addition to some innovative ideas, elements of this new received wisdom are redolent of the antiquarian speculation of the 18th century. However, ‘Celticity’ is now being regarded by New Agers primarily as a quality rather than a matter of historical or geographical fact, and the Celts, with their enlightened priests the Druids, have become the Noble Savages of Britain.     

The persistence of false beliefs

Do false beliefs last? To explore this question, this study planted false beliefs or memories of a childhood experience with asparagus. We found that these false beliefs had consequences for subjects, when assessed directly after the suggestive manipulation. Moreover, subjects were brought back two weeks later to see if their false beliefs persisted. After two weeks, subjects' confidence in their new memories, and the consequences of those memories were diminished, but not extinguished. These false beliefs were found to be somewhat weaker than other subjects' true beliefs for the same events. Another novel finding was that the manipulation was sufficiently powerful to affect actual food choices.     

Attentional episodes in visual perception

Is one's temporal perception of the world truly as seamless as it appears? This article presents a computationally motivated theory suggesting that visual attention samples information from temporal episodes (episodic simultaneous type/serial token model; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009). Breaks between these episodes are punctuated by periods of suppressed attention, better known as the attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). We test predictions from this model and demonstrate that participants were able to report more letters from a sequence of 4 targets presented in a dense temporal cluster than from a sequence of 4 targets interleaved with nontargets. However, this superior report accuracy comes at a cost in impaired temporal order perception. Further experiments explore the dynamics of multiple episodes and the boundary conditions that trigger episodic breaks. Finally, we contrast the importance of attentional control, limited resources, and memory capacity constructs in the model.     

Neural correlates of facial emotion processing in infancy

In the present study we examined the neural correlates of facial emotion processing in the first year of life using ERP measures and cortical source analysis. EEG data were collected cross‐sectionally from 5‐ (N = 49), 7‐ (N = 50), and 12‐month‐old (N = 51) infants while they were viewing images of angry, fearful, and happy faces. The N290 component was found to be larger in amplitude in response to fearful and happy than angry faces in all posterior clusters and showed largest response to fear than the other two emotions only over the right occipital area. The P400 and Nc components were found to be larger in amplitude in response to angry than happy and fearful faces over central and frontal scalp. Cortical source analysis of the N290 component revealed greater cortical activation in the right fusiform face area in response to fearful faces. This effect started to emerge at 5 months and became well established at 7 months, but it disappeared at 12 months. The P400 and Nc components were primarily localized to the PCC/Precuneus where heightened responses to angry faces were observed. The current results suggest the detection of a fearful face in infants’ brain can happen shortly (~200–290 ms) after the stimulus onset, and this process may rely on the face network and develop substantially between 5 to 7 months of age. The current findings also suggest the differential processing of angry faces occurred later in the P400/Nc time window, which recruits the PCC/Precuneus and is associated with the allocation of infants’ attention.     

Real versus facsimile reinforcers on the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (([Bechara et al., 1994]) is an effective neuropsychological tool for the assessment of 'real-life' decision-making in a laboratory environment. It has been employed in a wide range of circumstances, though researchers have sometimes employed real money reinforcers instead of the facsimile (or 'monopoly'-type) money used by. The present study investigated whether the type of reinforcer produced any differences in performance. There were no significant differences between the two conditions, though the Facsimile Money condition produced a greater range (and a higher standard deviation) than the Real Money condition. This finding is especially important when considering the Gambling Task as a tool in clinical neuropsychology--where there are risks, at the individual subject level, of both false positive and false negative classification errors.