Children's use of geometric information in mapping tasks

Accumulating evidence, particularly from research using the disorientation technique, demonstrates early sensitivity to geometric properties of space. However, it is not known whether children can use geometric cues to interpret a map. The current study examined how 3- to 6-year-olds use geometric features of layouts in solving mapping tasks. Children were asked to identify a target location in a layout shaped as an isosceles triangle by using information provided in a picture of that layout. Performance depended on whether the shape was presented explicitly or needed to be inferred. Younger participants performed better when the triangle was formed by continuous connected lines than when it was formed by separate objects. Performance also depended on the type of geometric cues available. Children found it easier to establish mapping for targets located in the unique corner of the triangle than for targets located in equal-sized corners. Overall, the findings reveal both a remarkable early ability to use geometric information in mapping and limits in this ability.     

In search of perceptual priming in a semantic classification task

Four experiments tested for perceptual priming for written words in a semantic categorization task. Repetition priming was obtained for low-frequency words when unrelated categorizations were performed at study and test (Experiment 1), but it was not orthographically mediated given that written-to-written and spoken-to-written word priming was equivalent (Experiments 2 and 3). Furthermore, no priming was obtained between pictures and words (Experiment 4), suggesting that the nonorthographic priming was largely phonological rather than semantic. These results pose a challenge to standard perceptual theories of priming that should expect orthographic priming when words are presented in a visual format at study and test.     

Masked priming is abstract in the left and right visual fields

Two experiments assessed masked priming for words presented to the left and right visual fields in a lexical decision task. In both Experiments, the same magnitude and pattern of priming was obtained for visually similar (kiss-KISS) and dissimilar (read-READ) prime-target pairs. These findings provide no support for the hypothesis that word identification is mediated by separate and lateralized abstract and specific visual form systems. Strikingly, equivalent priming was observed when primes and targets were presented to the same or opposite visual fields, suggesting that priming occurs after visual information from the two hemispheres is integrated.     

An Evaluation of Sales Training in the U.S. Banking Industry

Abstract

The U.S. banking industry has recently recognized the importance of developing a strong personal selling program in order to compete in the new deregulated environment. This study reports the findings of a national survey on the extent and level of sales training by U.S. banks. Results suggest that the industry has much sales training to do if it wishes to compete effectively within the financial services industry.     

Increasing Efficiency in Military Learning: Theoretical Considerations and Practical Applications

Given the fundamental importance of higher-order cognitive skills for military personnel, increasing learning efficiency during training is paramount. The current article expands upon the state-based information-loss processing model, a comprehensive framework elucidating the processes involved in acquiring higher-order cognitive skills, to enumerate best practices for military training. Emphasis is placed on identifying empirically supported, state-of-the-art learning efficiency strategies and methodologies to address points of information loss throughout the learning process. Implications and pragmatic recommendations for simulation-based military training are discussed.     

The Role of Age of Acquisition in Bilingual Word Translation: Evidence from Spanish-English Bilinguals

The present research tested the hypothesis that the age at which one’s first language (L1) words are learned influences language processing in bilinguals. Prior research on bilingual language processing by Kroll and colleagues has suggested that memory links between L1 words and conceptual representations are stronger than memory links between one’s second language (L2) word and conceptual representations. We hypothesized that the strengths of memory links between L1 words and conceptual representations are stronger for words learned early in life than for words learned later in life. Support for the hypothesis was obtained in bilingual translation experiment with 36 Spanish–English bilinguals. Participants translated L1 words into L2 and L2 words into L1. Half of the L1 words were learned early in childhood (early AoA words), and half were learned later in life (late AoA words). The L2 words were translation equivalents of the L1 words tested; the average age at which L2 words were learned was age 7. Target words were presented either in random order or blocked by semantic category. Translation times were longer when trials were blocked by semantic category (i.e., categorical interference) occurred only when early AoA L1 words were translated into L2. Implications for current models of bilingual memory are discussed.     

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.