The effects of recent practice on task switching

Four experiments investigated the effect of recent selective practice on the cost of switching between 2 tasks afforded by letter-digit pairs: alphabet arithmetic and shape comparison. Experiments 1 and 2 found a greater cost associated with switching to the more recently practiced task: evidence that task-set inertia contributes to switching costs. Experiment 3 found this effect to be limited to trials on which a recently trained stimulus followed another such stimulus: a result problematic for all current theories of task-set priming. Experiment 4 showed that the effect of recent practice was eliminated by active preparation for a task switch: It appears that endogenous task-set preparation reduces the effects of task-set inertia. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)     

How Collective Participation Impacts Social Identity: A Longitudinal Study from India

A key issue for political psychology concerns the processes whereby people come to invest psychologically in socially and politically significant group identities. Since Durkheim, it has been assumed that participation in group‐relevant collective events increases one's investment in such group identities. However, little empirical research explicitly addresses this or the processes involved. We investigated these issues in a longitudinal questionnaire study conducted at one of the world's largest collective events—a month‐long Hindu festival in north India (the Magh Mela). Data gathered from pilgrims and comparable others who did not attend the event show that one month after the event, those who had participated (but not the controls) exhibited heightened social identification as a Hindu and increased frequency of prayer rituals. Data gathered from pilgrims during the festival predicted these outcomes. Specifically, perceptions of sharing a common identity with other pilgrims and of being able to enact one's social identity in this event helped predict changes in participants' identification and behavior. The wider significance of these data for political psychology is discussed.     

Cofinal Stable Logics

We generalize the \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical formulas to \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical rules, and prove that each intuitionistic multi-conclusion consequence relation is axiomatizable by \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical rules. This yields a convenient characterization of stable superintuitionistic logics. The \({(\wedge, \vee)}\)-canonical formulas are analogues of the \({(\wedge,\to)}\)-canonical formulas, which are the algebraic counterpart of Zakharyaschev’s canonical formulas for superintuitionistic logics (si-logics for short). Consequently, stable si-logics are analogues of subframe si-logics. We introduce cofinal stable intuitionistic multi-conclusion consequence relations and cofinal stable si-logics, thus answering the question of what the analogues of cofinal subframe logics should be. This is done by utilizing the \({(\wedge,\vee,\neg)}\)-reduct of Heyting algebras. We prove that every cofinal stable si-logic has the finite model property, and that there are continuum many cofinal stable si-logics that are not stable. We conclude with several examples showing the similarities and differences between the classes of stable, cofinal stable, subframe, and cofinal subframe si-logics.     

Language as shaped by the brain

It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary, principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution. Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a "moving target" both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the original motivation for UG--the mesh between learners and languages--arises because language has been shaped to fit the human brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent "organism," which evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics.     

中国共产主义运动中的哲学家--艾思奇、毛泽东和中国马克思主义哲学

在中国马克思主义哲学发展过程中,1937年是个重要的分水岭。这一年毛泽东在延安抗日军政大学发表了一系列讲演,主要讨论马克思主义哲学中的辩证唯物主义。这些讲演记录的部分原稿经修订后最终以论文形式发表,并在1949年后奠定了中国官方解释马克思主义哲学的基石。这些哲学论文     

Adorno vs. Levinas: Evaluating points of contention

Although Adorno and Levinas share many arguments, I attempt to sharpen and evaluate their disagreements. Both held extreme and seemingly opposite views of art, with Adorno arguing that art presents modernity’s highest order of truth and Levinas denouncing it as shameful idolatry. Considering this striking difference brings to light fundamental substantive and methodological incompatibilities between them. Levinas’ assertion of the transcendence of the face should be understood as the most telling point of departure between his and Adorno’s critiques of instrumental reason. I attempt to explain why Levinas believed this move was justifiable and how Adorno would understand Levinas’ notion of illeity as a cultural byproduct and a form of dogmatism. Adorno’s historical and sociological account of the disenchantment of the world and the destruction of aura within a culture fully administered by scientific rationality and economic reductionism sharply contrasts to Levinas’ transcendental phenomenology, and I argue that Adorno’s thoroughgoing refusal to constrain dialectical reflection is ultimately more compelling. This paper benefited from exchanges with Jay Bernstein, Bob Scharff, Gregg Horowitz, David Wood, Max Pensky, Scott Bakker, and critics of the earlier version of this argument presented at the 2004 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. I also thank unnamed reviewers from Continental Philosophy Review for their generous and thoughtful comments and the members of the University of New Hampshire Center for Humanities for their financial support.