A New Argument for Pragmatism?

Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.     

The Two Faces of Evidentialism

In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.

State anxiety impairs attentional control when other sources of control are minimal

Research suggests anxiety impairs attentional control; however, this effect has been unreliable. We argue that anxiety’s impairment of attentional control is subtle, and can be obscured by other non-emotional sources of control. We demonstrate this by examining conflict adaptation, an enhancement in attentional control following a trial with high conflict between distracter and target stimuli. Participants completed a Stroop task featuring incongruent (e.g. RED in green font; high-conflict) and control (e.g. +++ in green font; low-conflict) trials. More state-anxious participants showed greater Stroop interference following control trials, but interference was uniformly low following incongruent trials. This suggests state anxiety can impair attention, but other sources of top-down control – such as conflict adaptation – can easily overcome this impairment. This is consistent with recent theories of anxious cognition and shows that anxiety researchers must attend to the dynamics and sources of attentional control.     

It's a Museum,But Not as We Know It: Issues for Local Residents Accessing the Museum of Old and New Art

The Museum of Old and New Art (MONA), in Australia's island state of Tasmania, bears all the hallmarks of the new museology and a flagship museum. Located in a largely working class area, there are expectations of visitors from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly local residents. However most visitors are tourists, middle-class, and highly educated. In this article, the authors ask, “What are the issues affecting accessibility to MONA for local residents?” In asking this, they aim to better understand local engagement with MONA and shed light on potential socio-cultural transformation. Using a survey, interviews, and focus groups with local residents, the authors found that accessibility at MONA is defined along familiar socioeconomic lines, though there are indications of change that warrant further investigation. The expense of food and beverage, concern about children's behavior, and the explicit nature of some art all impact on accessibility, particularly for those with less cultural capital.     

Comparison of Hispanic children with and without limited English proficiency on the Naglieri Nonverbal Ability Test

Hispanic children with (n=148) and without (n=148) limited English proficiency were given the Naglieri Nonverbal Ability Test (NNAT; J. A. Naglieri. 1997a) and the Stanford Achievement Test-9th edition (SAT-9: 1995). The groups were selected from the NNAT standardization sample (N=22.620) and matched on geographic region, gender, socioeconomic status, urbanicity. and ethnicity. There was a very small difference (d ratio=0.1) between the NNAT standard scores for the children with limited English proficiency (M - 98.0) and those without limited English proficiency (M=96.7). The NNAT correlated moderately and similarly with achievement for the 2 groups. The sample of children with limited English proficiency earned considerably lower scores on SAT-9 Reading and Verbal subtests. Results suggest that the NNAT may be useful for the assessment of Hispanic children with and without limited English proficiency.     

Developmental and individual differences in pure numerical estimation

The authors examined developmental and individual differences in pure numerical estimation, the type of estimation that depends solely on knowledge of numbers. Children between kindergarten and 4th grade were asked to solve 4 types of numerical estimation problems: computational, numerosity, measurement, and number line. In Experiment 1, kindergartners and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd graders were presented problems involving the numbers 0-100; in Experiment 2, 2nd and 4th graders were presented problems involving the numbers 0-1,000. Parallel developmental trends, involving increasing reliance on linear representations of numbers and decreasing reliance on logarithmic ones, emerged across different types of estimation. Consistent individual differences across tasks were also apparent, and all types of estimation skill were positively related to math achievement test scores. Implications for understanding of mathematics learning in general are discussed.     

Principles that are invoked in the acquisition of words, but not facts

A controversial question is whether language acquisition is the result of domain-general or domain-specific principles. Focusing on word-learning, Markson and Bloom (Nature 385(6619) (1997) 813) recently argued that the ability to learn and retain new words (count nouns) is the result of abilities that are not specific to language. In the current experiment, we replicate their empirical finding, but challenge their domain-general interpretation by highlighting a crucial distinction between the principles involved in learning a count noun, as compared to learning a fact. The current results confirm that learning count nouns and facts involve (at least) two common components: establishing a mapping to a designated individual, and retaining this mapping over time. However, these results go further to document that the processes invoked in the acquisition of words differ from those invoked in the acquisition of facts. Children spontaneously and systematically extended a novel count noun exclusively to other members of the same category, but revealed no such systematicity when extending a fact. This illustrates that there are principles that are invoked in learning a novel count noun that are not invoked in learning a fact.     

A 32-society investigation of the influence of perceived economic inequality on social class stereotyping

There is a growing body of work suggesting that social class stereotypes are amplified when people perceive higher levels of economic inequality—that is, the wealthy are perceived as more competent and assertive and the poor as more incompetent and unassertive. The present study tested this prediction in 32 societies and also examines the role of wealth-based categorization in explaining this relationship. We found that people who perceived higher economic inequality were indeed more likely to consider wealth as a meaningful basis for categorization. Unexpectedly, however, higher levels of perceived inequality were associated with perceiving the wealthy as less competent and assertive and the poor as more competent and assertive. Unpacking this further, exploratory analyses showed that the observed tendency to stereotype the wealthy negatively only emerged in societies with lower social mobility and democracy and higher corruption. This points to the importance of understanding how socio-structural features that co-occur with economic inequality may shape perceptions of the wealthy and the poor.