Children's and adults’ understanding of the “disgust face”

By the age of 4 years, children (N=120) know the meaning of the word disgust as well as they know the meaning of anger and fear; for example, when asked, they are equally able to generate a plausible cause for each of these emotions. Yet, in tasks involving facial expressions (free labelling of faces, deciding whether or not a face expresses disgust, or finding a “disgust face” in an array of faces), a majority of 3- to 7-year-old children (N=144) associated the prototypical “disgust face” with anger and denied its association with disgust (25% of adults on the same tasks did so as well). These results challenge the assumption that all humans easily recognise disgust from its facial expression and that this recognition is a precursor to children's understanding of the emotion of disgust.     

Embodied Knowing, Embodied Theology: What Happened to the Body?

As part of a larger project on human bodies and theological knowledge, this paper is a preliminary investigation into how biology and physicality shape human knowing. It asks whether, in the frequent use of the phrase embodied knowing or embodied theology, religion scholars have paid sufficient attention to actual bodies. It argues that there has been a lapse of attention to physical dimensions of bodies in the unreflective employment of such phrases, ironically among practical and pastoral theologians who have strong interest in understanding how theology operates on the ground. The paper traces evolving interest in embodiment across several disciplines, including theology, before exploring what might be learned from recent research on evolution, biology, and bodies in anthropology and the biological sciences.     

Introducing the sick face

Research on disgust in neuroscience, medicine, and psychology often relies on a disgust facial expression from a standardized set. Two studies (N = 60 and N = 160) compared this standard disgust face to a new facial expression called the “sick face” posed by three different actors asked to look as if they were sick and about to vomit. Relative to the standard disgust face, the sick face was significantly more likely to be endorsed as disgust, less likely to be endorsed as another emotion, and rated as conveying disgust more intensely. Disgust may not have a facial signal, but various faces may serve as cues to disgust.     

Parenting Practices and Prospective Levels of Hyperactivity/Inattention Across Early- and Middle-Childhood

This study examined specific parenting practices as predictors of prospective levels of children’s hyperactivity/inattention across early- and middle-childhood. Participants were a mixed-sex community cohort (N?=?976; 52 % boys) aged 4–10 years (M?=?6.5, SD?=?1.3). Measures of parenting practices, hyperactivity/inattention, conduct problems, and maternal education were collected at baseline, and hyperactivity/inattention re-assessed at 12-month follow-up. Analyses examined predictors of 12-month hyperactivity/inattention while controlling for levels at baseline. High levels of parental involvement were associated with reduced levels of hyperactivity/inattention, but only across early childhood. Conversely, increases in child age were associated with increased levels of hyperactivity/inattention across middle-childhood, but only among children exposed to high levels of inconsistent discipline. Inconsistent discipline and parental involvement appear to be uniquely associated with prospective hyperactivity/inattention across childhood, independent of associated conduct problems. Our results further suggest some developmental specificity with regard to the effects of these distinct dimensions of parenting on hyperactivity/inattention at different points in childhood.     

An appreciative response to Niels Henrik Gregersen's JKR research conference lecture

Abstract

Using human embryos in research remains a controversial issue, especially in Christian bioethics. Although the official Catholic stance rejects human embryonic stem cell research, Christian thinkers T. Peters, K. Lebacqz and G. Bennett support it. They endorse the 14-day Rule and argue that ex vivo embryos lack moral worth. I examine and challenge the 14-day Rule and location argument (in vivo/ex vivo). I develop a theory of holistic anthropology and intrinsic moral value for human embryos. I conclude that intrinsic moral value is not equal to full moral value, and therefore use of embryos in biomedical research is morally permissible.