Thought action fusion: can it be corrected?

The goal of this study was to investigate whether or not a brief educational intervention delivered prior to engaging in an anxiety-provoking task (writing a sentence about hoping that a friend/relative was in a car accident) would be effective in offsetting anxiety in college students with a strong propensity to endorse statements of thought action fusion (TAF). As hypothesized, individuals receiving the educational intervention were less anxious than a placebo intervention control group at post task; they were also less likely to endorse statements of TAF after receiving the educational intervention. Also, those who chose to neutralize after writing the sentence (regardless of experimental group) were more likely to report feeling guiltier, more immoral and a greater sense of responsibility about writing the sentence prior to neutralizing than those who did not subsequently neutralize. These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder and implications for prevention programs.     

Categorical perception of race

Traditionally, research demonstrating categorical perception (CP) has assumed that CP occurs only in cases where natural continua are divided categorically by long-term learning or innate perceptual programming. More recent research suggests that this may not be true, and that even novel continua between novel stimuli such as unfamiliar faces can show CP effects as well. Given this, we ask whether CP is dependent solely on the representation of individual stimuli, or whether stimulus categories themselves can also cause CP. Here, we test the hypothesis that continua between individual faces that cross the categorical boundary between races show an enhanced CP effect. We find that continua running from a black face to a white face do, indeed, show stronger CP effects than continua between two black faces or two white faces. This suggests that CP effects are enhanced when continua run between two distinctly represented individual stimuli, and are further enhanced when those individuals are, in turn, members of different stimulus categories.     

DNA-sequence patenting: National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) position paper

In November 2000, the Genetic Services Committee of the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) convened a working group to draft a position paper on patenting of DNA-sequences. The mandate of the group was to produce general position statements that support the perspective and needs of consumers of DNA-based genetic tests and therapies (our patients and their families) and participants in DNA-based genetic research. After review and discussion of the literature on DNA-sequence patenting issues, the working group drafted position statement points that support current United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) guidelines; broad licensing of DNA-sequence patents; nonenforcement of DNA-sequence patents in noncommercial research; reasonable royalty rates; an informed consent process for research participants that discloses whether they can share in any financial rewards relating to the project; the development of guidelines for licensing of DNA-sequence patents; and the establishment of oversight organizations to monitor licensing of DNA-sequence patents. These position statements were approved by the NSGC Board of Directors in the fall of 2001.     

A Qualitative Investigation of Somali Immigrant Perceptions of Disability: Implications for Genetic Counseling

This study examined the potential utility of genetic counseling services for Somali immigrants by investigating their perceptions of disability. Five Somali women participated in structured interviews that assessed their perceptions of the nature, causes, and impact of disability, and care for persons with disabilities. Using a Heideggerian Hermeneutics qualitative method of analysis, six major themes emerged: (1) disability refers to both physical and mental conditions, with mental disability generally thought of first and as more severe; (2) in Somalia, the family cares for disabled family members, treating them as if they were normal (3) there are major cultural differences between Somalia and the United States in how persons with disabilities are treated; (4) caring for a person with a disability is stressful for the family; (5) Allah determines whether or not a child will be disabled, and this cannot be predicted or altered; and (6) family is the primary life focus, and therefore, risk of disability does not affect reproductive decisions. These themes suggest that traditional genetic counseling may have limited utility for Somali immigrants. We recommend several modifications to traditional genetic counseling for Somali patients that also may be useful for populations that have similar beliefs.     

Congruence couple therapy for alcohol use and gambling disorders with comorbidities (part I): Outcomes from a randomized controlled trial

A nonblinded randomized trial was conducted at two Canadian provincial outpatient addiction clinics that tested the effectiveness of a systemic congruence couple therapy (CCT) versus individual-based treatment-as-usual (TAU) on nine clinical outcomes: (1) primary outcomes—alcohol use and gambling, psychiatric symptoms, and couple adjustment; (2) secondary outcomes—emotion regulation, substance use, depression, post-traumatic stress symptoms, and life stress. Data of primary clients and partners (N = 46) were analyzed longitudinally across baseline, posttreatment (5 months), and follow-up (8 months). Alcohol use disorder (95%) and gambling disorder (5%) were in the severe range at baseline, and co-addiction was 27%. Psychiatric comorbidity was 100%, and 18% of couples were jointly addicted. Between-group comparison favored CCT in primary outcomes with medium-to-large effect sizes (Cohen's h = 0.74–1.44). Secondary outcomes were also significantly stronger for CCT (Cohen's h = 0.27–1.53). Within-group, for all primary outcomes, a significant proportion of symptomatic CCT clients and partners improved, converging with ANOVA results of large effect sizes (0.14–0.29). All secondary outcomes improved significantly in CCT with large effect sizes (0.14–0.50). TAU showed significant within-group improvement in alcohol use, other substance use, and life stress with large effect sizes (0.16–0.40). Primary clients and partners made largely equivalent improvement within CCT and within TAU. Results were triangulated with clients' satisfaction ratings and counselors' reports. Overall, significant within-group effects were detected for CCT both clinically and statistically and between-group difference favored CCT. Future trials are required to validate these promising findings.     

Examining the influence of group diversity on the functioning of community-based participatory research partnerships: A mixed methods study

Public health has endorsed the use of community-based participatory research (CBPR) to address health inequities involving diverse and marginalized communities. However, few studies have examined how group diversity among members of CBPR partnerships influenced how well the partnerships achieve their goals of addressing health inequities through equitable collaboration. We conducted secondary, convergent, mixed methods analysis to (1) evaluate the association between group diversity and participatory decision-making within CBPR partnerships, and (2) identify the perceived characteristics, benefits, and challenges of group diversity within CBPR partnerships. Using data from a cross-site study of federally funded CBPR partnerships, we analyzed and integrated data from surveys of 163 partnerships (n = 448 partners) and seven in-depth case study interviews (n = 55 partners). Quantitatively, none of the measured characteristics of group diversity was associated with participatory decision-making within the partnerships. Qualitatively, we found that partnerships mainly benefited from membership differences in functional characteristics (e.g., skillset) but faced challenges from membership differences in sociocultural characteristics (e.g., gender and race). The integrated findings suggest the need to further understand how emergent group characteristics and how practices that engage in group diversity contribute to collective functioning of the partnerships. Attention to this area can help promote health equity achievements of CBPR partnerships.     

When to intervene and take a stand: Evaluating bystander roles in intergroup name-calling contexts

Children (n = 121, M = 9.86 years, SD = 0.64) and adolescents (n = 101, M = 12.84 years, SD = 0.69) evaluated proactive and passive bystander behaviour to intergroup name-calling (N = 222, 54% female). Scenarios depicted ingroup perpetrators and outgroup victims who were from a stigmatized group (ethnicity) or a non-stigmatized group (school affiliation), with bystanders depicted as being proactive (intervening to help) or passive (failing to challenge the aggression), counter to their own group's norm. Children and adolescents personally evaluated proactive bystanders more favourably than passive bystanders. However, adolescents, more than children, expected their peers to be more positive about proactive bystanders than passive bystanders in the stigmatized context. Results are discussed in terms of the complexities of bystander decisions and implications for anti-bullying interventions.     

Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.