Visual and phonetic codes and the process of generation in letter matching

Physically identical letter pairs are matched more quickly than are nominally identical or nonidentical pairs, which is an effect usually interpreted as resulting from the use of a visual memory code versus a phonetic or name code. However, prior manipulations of phonetic confusion and visual-field lateralization have provided little evidence consistent with this notion. Here, three reaction time experiments suggest through converging confusion and visual-field manipulations that a phonetic code is not used in either simultaneous or successive letter matching. Two additional experiments yield confusion evidence consistent with a rapid visual generation process underlying nominally identical and nonidentical matches, emphasizing the role of visual memory processes in all of the commonly used same-different letter-matching tasks. Implications for coding and hemispheric theories are discussed.     

Relationships among Multiple Task Asymmetries: II. A Large-Sample Factor Analysis

Samples from published and unpublished factor analytic studies of multiple task asymmetry are combined to produce a large-sample factor analysis of 10 measures, prescreened for significant asymmetry and acceptable reliability, from 9 lateralized tasks. A full correlational matrix is presented, with task pairings having sample sizes ranging from 103 to 479 (meanN= 290). Both significant positive and significant negative correlations between measures are found. Extraction and oblique rotation of five factors fails to reveal any evidence of a global relationship among lateral difference measures, and principal-components analysis likewise fails to reveal a component to which all measures correlate positively. However, evidence for local structure is found. Results are interpreted in terms of dissociable hemispheric processes, and consideration is given of the possible existence of modality-specific characteristic perceptual asymmetry and of single versus multiple determination of lateral differences.     

Fast visual generation: its nature and chronometrics.

The fast-generation model for the matching of mixed-case letter pairs (e.g., Aa, Ab) states that one or both members of a pair activate visual representations in memory of the opposite case, supporting "same" or "different" responses through crossmatching to representations of the pair members themselves. Here the reaction time and error results of three experiments using simultaneous matches support a specific variant of the model in which generation proceeds from the uppercase letter. Furthermore, a manipulation of stimulus onset asynchrony in a fourth experiment using near-simultaneous matches indicates that fast generation produces a visual representation that occurs within 67 msec of initiation and that decays within 200 msec. A fifth experiment contrasts simultaneous and successive matches and in the case of successive matches finds evidence in support of a regeneration process acting after an initial decay. Models of mixed-case matching that are based on the phonetic representation of letter names, or on abstract-letter identities, completely fail to account for the results. Fast generation is distinguishable from slow generation in that it shows fast (vs. slow) dynamics, rapid decay (vs. maintainability), no imagery (vs. imagery), and (probably) automatic (vs. controlled) processing.     

Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining

This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions.