Approaching Nature, ‘Sustainability’ and Ecological Crises from a Critical Social Psychological Perspective

This article considers the potential contribution of critical social psychology to the study of the relationship between humans and nature, particularly in terms of the role of human activities in ecological degradation. That human behaviour is having a profound impact on global climate and related phenomena has garnered broad scientific consensus and is communicated to the public in increasingly sophisticated ways. Psychology has been increasingly drawn upon by policy makers, pressure groups and related institutions in this context, in the hope of understanding, predicting and shaping behaviour and lifestyles towards more sustainable ends. In the past few decades, cognitive behaviourist models have dominated research and policy agendas concerned with identifying barriers to, and/or promoting ‘environmentally sustainable’ or ‘pro‐environmental’ behaviour. Yet despite the emergence of critical work, to date, there has been very little work in this field explicitly under the banner of critical social psychology. In this article, a brief outline of some of the tenets of critical social psychology is followed by a consideration of how these principles have been taken up in existing cross‐disciplinary critical approaches to the interrelated issues of environment, sustainability and human behaviour and the potential contribution of critical social psychology in these areas.     

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

Resistance to extinction versus extinction as discrimination

The hypothesis that response strength might be measured by persistence of responding in the face of extinction was discredited in the 1960s because experiments showed that responding persists longer following intermittent reinforcers than following continuous reinforcers. Instead, researchers proposed that the longer persistence following intermittent reinforcers arises because intermittent reinforcement more closely resembles extinction—a discrimination theory. Attention to resistance to extinction revived because one observation seemed to support the persistence hypothesis: Following training on a multiple schedule with unequal components, responding usually persisted longer in the formerly richer component than in the formerly lean component. This observation represents an anomaly, however, because results with single schedules and concurrent schedules contradict it. We suggest that the difference in results arises because the multiple-schedule procedure, while including extensive training on stimulus discrimination, includes no training on discrimination between food available and food unavailable, whereas comparable single- and concurrent-schedule procedures include such training with repeated extinction. In Experiment 1, we replicated the original result, and in Experiment 2 showed that when the multiple-schedule procedure includes training on food/no-food discrimination, extinction following multiple schedules contradicts behavioral momentum theory and agrees with the discrimination theory and research with single and concurrent schedules.     

From achievement to power: David C. McClelland,McBer & Company,and the business of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), 1962–1985

During the 1960s, Harvard psychologist David McClelland focused his research and business endeavors on increasing the need for achievement in small businesspeople, with the goal of fostering economic success in the developing world. However, by the early 1970s, McClelland would focus almost entirely on developing executives’ need for power in the United States. In this paper, I argue that underlying this shift was McClelland's dedication to the project of behavioral engineering and a newfound belief that training individuals in the responsible exercise of leadership and managerial power had become the most effective path to achieving his liberal political aims.     

Value Commitment,Resolute Choice,and the Normative Foundations of Behavioural Welfare Economics

Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioural economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioural economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’