When “All the Five Circles” are Four: New Exercises in Domain Restriction

The domain of a quantifier is determined by a variety of factors, which broadly speaking fall into two types. On the one hand, the context of utterance plays a role: if the focus of attention is on a particular collection of kangaroos, for example, then “Q kangaroos” is likely to range over the individuals in that set. On the other hand, the utterance itself will help to establish the quantificational domain, inter alia through presuppositions triggered within the sentence. In this paper, we concentrate our attention on constructions like the following, in which “the square to which ... ” is the critical presupposition trigger:

1. (i)
   Q circles ...
    
2. (ii)
   Q of these circles ...
    
3. (iii)
   Q of these five circles ... ... have the same colour as the square to which they are connected.
    

Many theories predict that all instances of these schemata will give rise to the presupposition that every circle is connected to a square. We present an analysis which predicts that these sentences should generally be accepted in a context in which not all the circles are connected to a square, with one exception only: if a quantified sentence is of type (iii) and Q is non-intersective, then the sentence should be more likely to be rejected. Furthermore, we predict that manipulating the context so as to make the connected circles more or less salient should have an effect on statements with non-intersective quantifiers only. These predictions were tested in a series of experiments.     

Our Obligation to the Dead

Can we have a real obligation to the dead, just as we do to the living, or is such a notion merely sentimental or metaphorical? Starting with the example of making a promise, I try to show that we can, since the dead, as well as the living, can have interests, not least because the notion of a person is, in part, a moral construction. ‘The dead’, then, are not merely dead, but particular dead persons, members of something like the sort of ‘transgenerational community’ proposed by Avner de–Shalit. More generally, I argue, we have an obligation to the dead that goes beyond the particularities of promise–making, on account of their role in having made us who we are. I then suggest, though only embryonically, that such obligations may appropriately be discharged by remembering the dead, who they were and what they did. Finally, I consider some possible objections.     

Towards a social model approach to counselling disabled clients

The social model of disability has emerged over the past 30 years in Britain to challenge the dominant individual, particularly medical and tragedy, models. This social model is borne from the experiences of disabled people and essentially defines disability as the discrimination faced by people with impairments. This paper explores the possible conflicts between some counselling approaches that can individualise and personalise problems and disability as a political issue. Drawing on research with counsellors and disabled clients, we illustrate the social construction of disability as an individualised problem within the counselling process. Considering the implications for counselling practice, we argue for an approach to counselling which recognises the social model of disability as the basis for social change.