Binocular depth discrimination depends on orientation

Using both the method of adjustment and forced-choice techniques, it was found that binocular depth thresholds depend on the orientation of the test targets, which in these experiments consisted of long, thin rods. Stereoacuity is greatest with vertical rods and decreases progressively as the angle of orientation approaches horizontal. The relationship between stereoacuity and orientation is governed by the orientation of the images of the targets on the retina, and is predicted fairly well by the sine of the angle of orientation, suggesting an equivalence between angular rotation and reductions in rod length.     

Do wild raccoons (Procyon lotor) use tools?

Animal Cognition - Being able to make and use tools was once considered to be an evolutionary hallmark of our species, but has since been documented in other animals. However, for reasons that...     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

According to what I will call ‘the disanalogy thesis,’ beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a ‘permissive situation’ with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible.     

Pairing People with Products: Anthropomorphizing the Object,Dehumanizing the Person

We present the first empirical integration of anthropomorphism and dehumanization, two intrinsically linked processes representing the extent to which the concept of humanness is activated for a given target. Across several experiments, we demonstrate that pairing a person and object in an ad, while focusing respondent attention on the object, leads to its being anthropomorphized and evaluated better compared to presenting it alone. However, compared to presenting a person alone, the same pairing leads to inferior evaluations of the person through a process of dehumanization. We rule out two alternative explanations for these effects, namely the transfer of an object's qualities to the person and consumption associations, and conduct a post‐test that provides additional support for our proposed activation/inhibition of humanness account. Finally, we inspect several moderators, finding that anthropomorphism only occurs with moderately and highly functional objects and dehumanization occurs irrespective of the person's gender or fame. By incorporating the literature on dehumanization, we propose new research questions to motivate future inquiry.     

An evaluation of simultaneous and sequential presentation of preferred and nonpreferred food to treat food selectivity

In the current investigation, we compared two methods of food presentation (simultaneous vs. sequential) to increase consumption of nonpreferred food for 3 children with food selectivity. In the simultaneous condition, preferred foods were presented at the same time as nonpreferred food (e.g., a piece of broccoli was presented on a chip). In the sequential condition, acceptance of the nonpreferred food resulted in presentation of the preferred food. Increases in consumption occurred immediately during the simultaneous condition for 2 of the 3 participants. For 1 participant, increases in consumption occurred in the simultaneous condition relative to the sequential condition, but only after physical guidance and re-presentation were added to treatment. Finally, consumption increased for 1 participant in the sequential condition, but only after several sessions. These results are discussed in terms of possible mechanisms that may alter preferences for food (i.e., establishing operations, flavor-flavor conditioning).     

Depth oriented brief therapy: an ideal technique as hospice lengths-of-stay continue to shorten

The authors note that as hospice patients' lengths-of-stay continue to shorten, psychosocial/spiritual counselors are being challenged to help patients and families process the myriad of issues terminal illness gives rise to. Given this reality, the authors suggest that the Depth Oriented Brief Therapy (DOBT) approach should prove especially useful. The DOBT premise is that if people can be helped to experience the emotional meanings of why they hold on to emotionally painful symptoms then they can abandon their symptoms for healthier ways of being.     

Human sensitivity to phase perturbations in natural images: a statistical framework

Fourier-phase information is important in determining the appearance of natural scenes, but the structure of natural-image phase spectra is highly complex and difficult to relate directly to human perceptual processes. This problem is addressed by extending previous investigations of human visual sensitivity to the randomisation and quantisation of Fourier phase in natural images. The salience of the image changes induced by these physical processes is shown to depend critically on the nature of the original phase spectrum of each image, and the processes of randomisation and quantisation are shown to be perceptually equivalent provided that they shift image phase components by the same average amount. These results are explained by assuming that the visual system is sensitive to those phase-domain image changes which also alter certain global higher-order image statistics. This assumption may be used to place constraints on the likely nature of cortical processing: mechanisms which correlate the outputs of a bank of relative-phase-sensitive units are found to be consistent with the patterns of sensitivity reported here.     

Influence of virtual reality training on the roadside crossing judgments of child pedestrians

The roadside crossing judgments of children aged 7, 9, and 11 years were assessed relative to controls before and after training with a computer-simulated traffic environment. Trained children crossed more quickly, and their estimated crossing times became better aligned with actual crossing times. They crossed more promptly, missed fewer safe opportunities to cross, accepted smaller traffic gaps without increasing the number of risky crossings, and showed better conceptual understanding of the factors to be considered when making crossing judgments. All age groups improved to the same extent, and there was no deterioration when children were retested 8 months later. The results are discussed in relation to theoretical arguments concerning the extent to which children's pedestrian judgments are amenable to training.