Factors facilitating adjustment to unemployment: Implications for intervention

Conducted a community survey in the Fall of 1984 in a sample of high unemployment blue-collar census tracts in southeastern Michigan. Results of earlier analyses using these data showed that involuntarily unemployed workers had significantly elevated levels of depression, anxiety, somatization, and self-reported physical illness relative to a stably employed comparison group (Kessler, House, & Turner, 1987). Results presented in this paper document that this relationship is modified by social support (as measured by social integration and the availability of a confidant), self-concept, and various coping processes. Further analyses allowed us to determine the way in which these modifiers operate. The modifying effects of social support and coping operate primarily by buffering the impact of unemployment-related financial strain on the health outcomes. Self-concept operates primarily by attenuating vulnerability to other stressful life events. The implications of these results for the design and implementation of preventive interventions are discussed.     

Binocular depth discrimination depends on orientation

Using both the method of adjustment and forced-choice techniques, it was found that binocular depth thresholds depend on the orientation of the test targets, which in these experiments consisted of long, thin rods. Stereoacuity is greatest with vertical rods and decreases progressively as the angle of orientation approaches horizontal. The relationship between stereoacuity and orientation is governed by the orientation of the images of the targets on the retina, and is predicted fairly well by the sine of the angle of orientation, suggesting an equivalence between angular rotation and reductions in rod length.     

Do wild raccoons (Procyon lotor) use tools?

Animal Cognition - Being able to make and use tools was once considered to be an evolutionary hallmark of our species, but has since been documented in other animals. However, for reasons that...     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

According to what I will call ‘the disanalogy thesis,’ beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a ‘permissive situation’ with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible.