Mental representations of affect knowledge

The circumplex structure derived from similarity ratings of affect words is assumed to be a conceptual representation of affect anchored in semantic knowledge. Recently, it been suggested that this structure is not based on semantic knowledge at all, but may instead reflect a type of episodic knowledge: The degree to which emotions covary in everyday life. In two experience-sampling studies, we compared the semantic and the episodic hypotheses by comparing participants' similarity ratings to the observed covariations in their own affective experience computed from their momentary reports. In Study 2, participants also provided estimates of the degree to which their emotions covaried. Evidence from both studies indicate that similarity judgements are related both to semantic and episodic information, indicating that a pure episodic account of similarity ratings, and the mental representation of affect that they reflect, is untenable.     

Knowing what you're feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation

Individuals differ considerably in their emotion experience. Some experience emotions in a highly differentiated manner, clearly distinguishing among a variety of negative and positive discrete emotions. Others experience emotions in a relatively undifferentiated manner, treating a range of like-valence terms as interchangeable. Drawing on self-regulation theory, we hypothesised that individuals with highly differentiated emotion experience should be better able to regulate emotions than individuals with poorly differentiated emotion experience. In particular, we hypothesised that emotion differentiation and emotion regulation would be positively related in the context of intense negative emotions, where the press for emotion regulation is generally greatest. To test this hypothesis, participants' negative and positive emotion differentiation was assessed using a 14-day diary protocol. Participants' regulation of negative and positive emotions was assessed using laboratory measures. As predicted, negative emotion differentiation was positively related to the frequency of negative emotion regulation, particularly at higher levels of emotional intensity.     

Reflexive shifts of covert attention operate in an egocentric coordinate frame.

Covert shifts of attention have been shown to improve detection and discrimination thresholds for a range of visual stimuli. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the allocation of attention to a particular region of interest occurs in a retinotopic frame of reference, the importance of an allocentric, or object-based, framework has gained widespread empirical support. The current experiment investigates the nature of the spatial representation in which covert shifts of attention occur in response to a reflexive prime. Primes and targets were presented in four conditions designed to vary systematically the validity of the spatial relationship between the prime and target in egocentric or allocentric coordinate frameworks. A significant advantage, in terms of reaction time and correct identification, was found for targets located in positions previously primed in an egocentric (but not allocentric) framework whereas there was no advantage for locations primed in an allocentric (but not egocentric) framework. These results suggest that the allocation of covert spatial attention within an egocentric framework may be more important than previously thought.     

Individualism and the Cross Contexts Test

Abstract: Jerry Fodor has defended the claim that psychological theories should appeal to narrow rather than wide intentional properties. One of his arguments relies upon the cross contexts test, a test that purports to determine whether two events have the same causally relevant properties. Critics have charged that this test is too weak, since it counts certain genuinely explanatory relational properties in science as being causally irrelevant. Further, it has been claimed, the test is insensitive to the fact that special scientific laws allow for exceptions which do not undermine those laws. This paper refines the cross contexts test to meet these objections while still allowing it to play its role in Fodor's argument for narrow content in psychology.