The contribution of the human medial temporal lobe to perception: bridging the gap between animal and human studies.

The medial temporal lobe (MTL) has been considered traditionally to subserve declarative memory processes only. Recent studies in nonhuman primates suggest, however, that the MTL may also be critical to higher order perceptual processes, with the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex being involved in scene and object perception, respectively. The current article reviews the human neuropsychological literature to determine whether there is any evidence to suggest that these same views may apply to the human MTL. Although the majority of existing studies report intact perception following MTL damage in human amnesics, there have been recent studies that suggest that when scene and object perception are assessed systematically, significant impairments in perception become apparent. These findings have important implications for current mnemonic theories of human MTL function and our understanding of human amnesia as a result of MTL lesions.     

Do Programmers Prefer Predictable Expressions in Code?

Source code is a form of human communication, albeit one where the information shared between the programmers reading and writing the code is constrained by the requirement that the code executes correctly. Programming languages are more syntactically constrained than natural languages, but they are also very expressive, allowing a great many different ways to express even very simple computations. Still, code written by developers is highly predictable, and many programming tools have taken advantage of this phenomenon, relying on language model surprisal as a guiding mechanism. While surprisal has been validated as a measure of cognitive load in natural language, its relation to human cognitive processes in code is still poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the relationship between surprisal and programmer preference at a small granularity—do programmers prefer more predictable expressions in code? Using meaning-preserving transformations, we produce equivalent alternatives to developer-written code expressions and run a corpus study on Java and Python projects. In general, language models rate the code expressions developers choose to write as more predictable than these transformed alternatives. Then, we perform two human subject studies asking participants to choose between two equivalent snippets of Java code with different surprisal scores (one original and transformed). We find that programmers do prefer more predictable variants, and that stronger language models like the transformer align more often and more consistently with these preferences.     

Sex in the Head

Abstract Recent philosophical writing on sexual desire divides broadly into two camps. Reductionists take sexual desire to aim at an essentially physical bodily pleasure, whereas intentionalist accounts take a focus upon the reciprocal interaction of the mental states of the partners to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon. I argue that the apparent plausibility of reductionism rests upon the flawed assumption that sexual pleasure has the same uniform bodily character in all sexual encounters, which rests in turn upon flawed assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of persons as essentially embodied minds, I outline an alternative account of sexual desire, showing how the nature of the sexual pleasure we take in the body of another can be transformed by the significance the person or situation has for us. I proceed to show that my account of sexual desire is able to accommodate the entire range of sexual phenomena, including those that seem to undermine standard intentionalist accounts as well as those that reductionists have difficulty in fully explaining. Finally I make some brief remarks about the implications of my account of sexual desire for sexual morality, suggesting some reasons why it casts doubt on the view that universal participant consent is sufficient for a sexual act to be morally unproblematic.     

Aperture viewing : A review and a synthesis

We argue that two processes are involved in the visual perception of shapes moving behind narrow apertures. “Retinal painting” occurs when the eyes are free to pursue the moving shape and when the traverse time across the aperture is sufficiently short to allow visual persistence of the temporally successive views. When pursuit eye movements do not occur, however, the shape may still be perceived if it moves relatively slowly. The latter kind of perception does not involve seeing all the parts of the shape simultaneously (as in the case with retinal painting) but we demonstrate that shapes seen in this way have some of the same properties as conventionally presented shapes. The discussion emphasises the relevance of these findings to general problems in movement perception.