Kantian Themes in Contemporary Philosophy: Graham Bird

Michael Friedman criticises some recent accounts of Kant which 'detach' his transcendental principles from the sciences, and do so in order to evade naturalism. I argue that Friedman's rejection of that 'detachment' is ambiguous. In its strong form, which I claim Kant rejects, the principles of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics are represented as transcendental principles. In its weak form, which I believe Kant accepts, it treats those latter principles as higher order conditions of the possibility of both science and ordinary experience. I argue also that the appeal to naturalism is unhelpful because that doctrine is seriously unclear, and because the accounts Friedman criticises are open to objections independent of any appeal to naturalism.     

Automatic imitation of intransitive actions

Previous research has indicated a potential discontinuity between monkey and human ventral premotor-parietal mirror systems, namely that monkey mirror systems process only transitive (object-directed) actions, whereas human mirror systems may also process intransitive (non-object-directed) actions. The present study investigated this discontinuity by seeking evidence of automatic imitation of intransitive actions--hand opening and closing--in humans using a simple reaction time (RT), stimulus-response compatibility paradigm. Left-right and up-down spatial compatibility were controlled by ensuring that stimuli were presented and responses executed in orthogonal planes, and automatic imitation was isolated from simple and complex orthogonal spatial compatibility by varying the anatomical identity of the stimulus hand and response hemispace, respectively. In all conditions, action compatible responding was faster than action incompatible responding, and no effects of spatial compatibility were observed. This experiment therefore provides evidence of automatic imitation of intransitive actions, and support for the hypothesis that human and monkey mirror systems differ with respect to the processing of intransitive actions.     

The cognitive load of narrative lies

Lying is assumed to increase cognitive load, and it has been shown to slow response times to simple questions. We employed a dual‐task methodology, the detection response task (DRT), to assess cognitive load in telling narrative lies in a live, open‐question interview. The DRT requires participants to press a button in response to a tactile stimulus every 3–5 s while performing a primary task, in this case, recounting either truthful or deceitful narratives. We found weak support for slowing in the time to initiate a narrative response when lying. In contrast, we found strong support for an increase in cognitive load when producing a narrative lie, as measured by both slowed DRT responses and increased response omissions, although this effect decreased with time on task. We advocate dual‐task methodologies such as the DRT for increasing understanding of the assumptions made by theories of deception and for refining lie detection techniques.     

The Importance of Ethics in Modern Universities of Technology

Science and Engineering Ethics -     

Why is a verb like an inanimate object? Grammatical category and semantic category deficits

Semantic category effects, such as difficulties in naming animate things relative to inanimate objects, have been explained in terms of the relative weightings of perceptual and functional features within the semantic representations of these concepts. We argue that grammatical category deficits, such as difficulties in naming nouns relative to verbs, can be explained within the same framework. We hypothesize that verb concepts are richer in functional than sensory features and present a model of the semantic representations of animate nouns, inanimate nouns, and verbs. The model demonstrates that sensory feature damage results in a deficit for naming living things but spares verb naming, and functional feature damage results in a deficit for naming inanimate objects and verbs. We then report the assessment results of two patient groups. In accordance with the model's predictions, the "verb spared" patients were consistently worse at naming living things than inanimate objects, and their definitions of both living and nonliving items were lacking in sensory information. We conclude that damage to sensory features in semantic representations causes difficulties in naming concrete nouns relative to action verbs, and within the grammatical category of nouns, animate items will be more severely affected. Imageability was shown to be a strong predictor of naming performance in the "verb deficit" patients, and when this variable was controlled no class effect remained. Production of definitions revealed no differential damage to sensory or functional features, and no consistent effect of animacy in naming was shown. While the model suggests that verb deficits might occur in patients for whom functional features are damaged relative to sensory features, we conclude that the "verb deficit" shown in our patients (and potentially in many previously reported cases) was an artifact of the lower imageability of verbs in confrontation naming tasks.     

Spatial memory for food hidden by rats (Rattus norvegicus) on the radial maze: studies of memory for where,what, and when

Rats (Rattus norvegicus) were allowed to hide food items on an 8-arm radial maze by carrying the items from the center to boxes at the end of each arm. Retrieval tests given after rats had hidden 4 items showed that they selectively returned to the maze arms where food had been hidden (Experiments 1 and 2). When rats were allowed to hide pieces of cheese (refed food) and pretzels (less preferred food) on different arms, they both hid and retrieved cheese before pretzels (Experiments 2-5). In Experiment 6, rats chose between arms where cheese and pretzels were hidden,with cheese degraded at one delay interval but not the other. Together, these experiments indicate memory for what and where but not when.     

Relationship Between Specific Adverse Life Events and Psychiatric Disorders

This study examines whether certain psychiatric disorders are associated more closely with adverse life events than other disorders are, and whether some adverse life events are associated with a specific group of disorders (e.g., depressive disorders), but not with other disorders (e.g., anxiety disorders). A probability sample of youth aged 9–17 at 4 sites is used (N = 1,285). Univariate and multivariate logistic regressions identify specific relationships between 25 adverse life events and 9 common child and adolescent psychiatric disorders, measured by the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children. Conduct Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, and Dysthymia are significantly associated with many of the adverse life events examined, whereas Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Agoraphobia, and Social Phobia are related to very few. This study suggests that certain psychiatric disorders may be more closely associated with adverse life events than other psychiatric disorders are, and that some adverse life events seem to be related to specific types of disorders.