Perceptions of fear in other Children and adolescents: The role of gender and friendship status

Gender differences in fear were examined in 693 Chinese children and adolescents. Subjects were asked to rate their own fears, the fears of their best friends, and the fears of other classmates using the Fear Survey Schedule for Children — Revised (Ollendick, 1983). Consistent with previous investigations in Western and Eastern countries, girls rated themselves as more fearful than boys. In addition, both girls and boys rated their best friends as similar in number, content, and intensity of fears. However, girls rated their classmates as less fearful than themselves or their best friends, while boys rated their classmates as more fearful than themselves or their best friends. Findings are discussed in terms of gender role expectations and similarity-attraction hypotheses.     

Measures of life stress and social support specific to an Asian student population

We designed two new measures—the Index of Life Stress (ILS) and the Index of Social Support (ISS)—to assist in the prediction of cultural adjustment for an Asian international student population. In the present study, these two measures were administered to 101 Asian international students. Stability estimates over 1 month were high: .97 for the ILS and .81 for the ISS. Construct validity, assessed via factor analyses, and concurrent validity, assessed via regression analyses to criteria of depression, hopelessness, and suicide ideation were satisfactory. Incremental validity for these two measures relative to extant measures of life stress and social support were computed. Results from these analyses indicated that these two measures added incrementally to the prediction of adjustment beyond that offered by existing measures.     

The concept of the ‘Other’ in modern Arab thought: From Muhammad cAbdu to Abdallah Laroui

The primary condition for the progress, or indeed the survival, of human societies is their effective coalescence into one human society’ (Zurayk 1994, 96).     

Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading

Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz probes Gregory of Nyssa on divine simplicity, a topic that Radde‐Gallwitz treated earlier in a book‐length monograph and takes further here in response to critics. As he notes, the Cappadocians and their opponents shared belief in divine simplicity. But for Gregory, simplicity functions as part of affirming the co‐equal divinity of the Father and Son, against his opponents. Radde‐Gallwitz lists six negative claims that Gregory’s understanding of divine simplicity supports: (1) God is immaterial; (2) God is without parts; (3) God does not possess any perfection “by acquisition”; (4) God does not possess any perfection “by participation”; (5) in God, there is no mixture or conflux of qualities, especially opposite qualities; (6) in God, there are no degrees of more or less. Yet with regard to positive statements about God’s perfections—for example the relation of God’s goodness to God’s wisdom—things are more difficult, as Radde‐Gallwitz shows. Interpreters of Gregory have differed sharply on this issue, in part because Gregory does not make his position crystal clear. Radde‐Gallwitz himself earlier held that Gregory considers God to have real but non‐definitive perfections distinct from the divine essence. Indebted to Richard Cross, however, Radde‐Gallwitz here adjusts his view, distinguishing more firmly between the divine essence itself and our limited concepts. He draws upon the Platonic distinction between natural and conventional naming, which differ in their accounts of what makes words meaningful. Arguing that Gregory is a “naturalist,” he reads Gregory’s texts on divine simplicity in this light.     

The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions

Disjunctive inferences are difficult. According to the theory of mental models, it is because of the alternative possibilities to which disjunctions refer. Three experiments corroborated further predictions of the mental model theory. Participants judged that disjunctions, such as Either this year is a leap year or it is a common year are true. Given a disjunction such as Either A or B, they tended to evaluate the four cases in its ‘partition’: A and B, A and not‐B, not‐A and B, not‐A and not‐B, as ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ in ways that bore out the difference between inclusive disjunctions (‘or both’) and exclusive disjunctions (‘but not both’). Knowledge usually concerns what is true, and so when participants judge that a disjunction is false, or contingent, and evaluate the cases in its partition, they depend on inferences that yield predictable errors. They tended to judge that disjunctions, such as follows: Either the food is cold or else it is tepid, but not both, are true, though in fact they could be false. They tended to infer ‘mirror‐image’ evaluations that yield the same possibilities for false disjunctions as those for true disjunctions. The article considers the implications of these results for alternative theories based on classical logic or on the probability calculus.