New insights into the formation and duration of flashbulb memories: Evidence from medical diagnosis memories

Flashbulb memories are vivid and salient memories for the moment one hears about a surprising, emotional, and significant event. The current research examined flashbulb memories for a loved one's medical diagnosis, focusing on individual and situational factors associated with memory development and endurance over time. An online survey collected memory narratives and subjective ratings from 309 mothers who received a diagnosis of Down syndrome for their child. Time since diagnosis ranged from 1 month to 52 years. Using two independent measures, the Flashbulb Memory Checklist and the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire, we found that a majority of diagnosis memories qualified as flashbulb memories, even 20 years or more after the event. Importantly, support from the medical staff at diagnosis emerged as a critical variable related to flashbulb memory development and the persistence of these flashbulb memories over time.     

Of Art and Blasphemy

What does philosophy have to say about the argument that blasphemous art ought not to be publicly displayed? We examine four concepts of blasphemy: blasphemy as offence, attack on religion, attack on the sacred, attack on the blasphemer himself. We argue all four are needed to grasp this complex concept. We also argue for blasphemy as primarily a moral, not a religious concept. We then criticise four arguments for the public display of blasphemous art: it may be beautiful, provocative, devoutly intended, and is autonomous of religious concerns. Finally, we discuss the notions of blasphemy and blasphemous art as public offences. We conclude that the display of blasphemous art is a public, and not merely a private moral offence, and that there are respectable philosophical arguments for this conclusion.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Tuning the developing brain to emotional body expressions

Reading others' emotional body expressions is an essential social skill. Adults readily recognize emotions from body movements. However, it is unclear when in development infants become sensitive to bodily expressed emotions. We examined event‐related brain potentials (ERPs) in 4‐ and 8‐month‐old infants in response to point‐light displays (PLDs) of happy and fearful body expressions presented in two orientations (upright and inverted). The ERP results revealed that 8‐month‐olds but not 4‐month‐olds respond sensitively to the orientation and the emotion of the dynamic expressions. Specifically, 8‐month‐olds showed (i) an early (200–400 ms) orientation‐sensitive positivity over frontal and central electrodes, and (ii) a late (700–1100 ms) emotion‐sensitive positivity over temporal and parietal electrodes in the right hemisphere. These findings suggest that orientation‐sensitive and emotion‐sensitive brain processes, distinct in timing and topography, develop between 4 and 8 months of age.