Performance or capacity, the model still requires definitions and boundaries it doesn't have

Siegel is correct that, in its current form, the specific constructs underlying the Demands and Capacities Model cannot be adequately defined. However, substituting observable behavior (performance) for presumed underlying weaknesses in the speech production systems of those who stutter (capacity) does not appear to solve the problem of circularity identified. Rather, demands have not been adequately defined, either.

There is much to agree with in Siegel's note. However, it is not clear to me that the Demands and Capacities Model is salvaged by substituting the term “Performance” for “Capacity.” Rather, the problem with the Model is one of defining terms precisely enough so that the Model is not circular (as Ingham & Cordes (1997) have noted), or the logical inverse of Procruste's bed, as I have stated elsewhere (Bernstein Ratner, 1997), a model that fits all interpretations simply because it stretches to fit all possibilities.     

Processing speed in children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, inattentive type.

Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is among the most common and most often reconceptualized neurobehavioral disorders of childhood. In the most recent DSM-IV, a primarily inattentive subtype of ADHD (AD) has again been identified. This study explores the neuropsychological profile of this group of children. Eighty-two children referred for school-related problems participated. Twenty-five met criteria for AD; 52 met criteria for reading disability (RD); 9 were comorbid for RD and AD. AD children performed poorly on measures of information processing speed. Children with comorbid AD/RD were distinguishable from those with RD on speed of processing measures only. Vulnerability to information processing load may be at the root of many of the behavioral manifestations of AD.     

Lexical and Metrical Stress in Word Recognition: Lexical or Pre-lexical Influences?

The influence of lexical stress and/or metrical stress on spoken word recognition was examined. Two experiments were designed to determine whether response times in lexical decision or shadowing tasks are influenced when primes and targets share lexical stress patterns (JUVenile–BIBlical [Syllables printed in capital letters indicate those syllables receiving primary lexical stress.]). The results did not support an effect of lexical stress on the organization of lexical memory. In Experiment 3 primes and targets whose first syllables shared lexical stress only (MUDdy–PASta), metrical stress only (alTHOUGH–PASta), both cues (LECtern–PASta), or neither cue (conTROL–PASta) revealed no priming effect. However, targets whose first syllables were strong were responded to faster than targets whose first syllables were weak. Experiment 4 manipulated the metrical stress patterns of bi-syllabic primes and targets. Targets with strong–weak metrical stress patterns were responded to more quickly than those with strong–strong or weak–strong patterns. Although the priming paradigm did not reveal an influence of lexical and metrical stress on the organization of lexical memory, the data do support an influence of strong syllables on the processing of auditorily presented words.     

Learning a novel grapheme: effects of positional and phonemic context on children's spelling

Two experiments explored how children who encounter a new spelling for a phoneme generalize it to novel items. Children ages 5 1/2 to 9 (N = 123) were taught a CVC (consonant-vowel-consonant) nonword containing a new vowel spelling in the middle position (e.g., /gaik/ is spelled as giik). They were then asked to spell other nonwords containing the vowel or to judge spellings that had supposedly been produced by younger children. Children were sensitive to position in the spelling production task, being more likely to use the novel grapheme when the vowel appeared in the middle of a CVC target than when it appeared in word-initial or word-final position. Children were not significantly more likely to use the novel grapheme when the target shared the vowel and final consonant (rime) of the training stimulus than when it shared the initial consonant and vowel. Implications for views of spelling development are discussed.     

The cross-category effect: mere social categorization is sufficient to elicit an own-group bias in face recognition

Although the cross-race effect (CRE) is a well-established phenomenon, both perceptual-expertise and social-categorization models have been proposed to explain the effect. The two studies reported here investigated the extent to which categorizing other people as in-group versus out-group members is sufficient to elicit a pattern of face recognition analogous to that of the CRE, even when perceptual expertise with the stimuli is held constant. In Study 1, targets were categorized as members of real-life in-groups and out-groups (based on university affiliation), whereas in Study 2, targets were categorized into experimentally created minimal groups. In both studies, recognition performance was better for targets categorized as in-group members, despite the fact that perceptual expertise was equivalent for in-group and out-group faces. These results suggest that social-cognitive mechanisms of in-group and out-group categorization are sufficient to elicit performance differences for in-group and out-group face recognition.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.     

Could a middle level be the most fundamental?

Debates over what is fundamental assume that what is most fundamental must be either a “top” level (roughly, the biggest or highest-level thing), or a “bottom” level (roughly, the smallest or lowest-level things). Here I sketch an alternative to top-ism and bottom-ism, the view that a middle level could be the most fundamental, and argue for its plausibility. I then suggest that this view satisfies the desiderata of asymmetry, irreflexivity, transitivity, and well-foundedness of fundamentality, that the view has explanatory power on par with that of top-ism and bottom-ism, and that it has a unique connection to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

     

Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants’ estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg’s (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611–653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.